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This research starts from the question of how North Korea decides upon the types of its 
provocations against the South. To find the answer, the author divides the major 
provocations into three periods, according to their characteristics, and examines how the 
major decisive factors of the North’s crisis policy making, such as military strength, 
relations with China and the Soviet Union (Russia), regime stability, and economic power, 
affected its choice of provocation types. The results of the analysis suggest that 
Pyongyang has chosen the targets, scale, and methods of provocation by thoroughly 
evaluating its current military, diplomatic, political, and economic conditions. 
Therefore, what types of provocations will be initiated by North Korea in the 
future? One of the obvious points is that Pyongyang’s confidence to defeat Seoul will not 
be restored soon, and the unexpected strong response of the United States and South 
Korea will confuse the North’s strategic decision making. For that reason, the most 
effective way for South Korea to deter any possible provocations by the North is to put 
more pressure on the Kim regime by using its overwhelming national power and 
conveying its strong intention to retaliate against the North’s threats on the basis of the 
firm ROK-U.S. military alliance. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The greatest threat to South Korea is North Korea. Due to the North’s constant 
provocations over the 60 years since the Korean War, South Korea has suffered 
enormous damage and made great sacrifices to establish stability on the Korean Peninsula. 
Though leaders from both countries have sometimes met and agreed on the need for a 
new era of peace, provocations have continued without intermission. Pyongyang has 
continued its unreliable behavior, even during the ten years when South Korea undertook 
practical changes for peace under the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun administrations. Most recently, the North’s deliberate provocations (such as 
the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island 
in 2010) significantly aggravated the security environment of the peninsula. 
These provocations have not always taken the same form. The military and 
nonmilitary threats over half a century have differed widely in their targets, scale, and 
methods. For example, it is hard to categorize the raid on the Blue House in 1968, the 
bombing of a Korean Air flight in 1987, and several skirmishes in the West Sea in the 
1990s and the 2000s as a single type of aggression. North Korea has diversified the types 
of provocation according to specific situations and conditions, and this political technique 
has hindered the South’s ability to respond successfully. The important point is that it is 
hard to figure out why North Korea chooses a particular type of provocation in a certain 
circumstance. Given the possibility of South Korea’s strong response, and the risk of 
such a backlash being more than the North Korean regime can handle, it can be inferred 
that the types of provocation North Korea is willing to undertake might not be decided 
accidentally. This research, therefore, tries to find the practical answer about how North 




The outcome of this research on how the types of the North’s provocation are 
chosen can be a useful foundation to predict the forms of upcoming threats and prepare 
suitable strategies and responses. Furthermore, it can ultimately promote South Korea’s 
effective deterrence against the North’s continuing provocations. In the current tense 
situation, where North and South face each other across the Military Demarcation Line, 
repeated provocations are the most efficient diplomatic measures of the Kim regime to 
overcome domestic instability, economic plight, and international isolation without 
plunging into an unwanted war. Seoul, therefore, should recognize that Pyongyang will 
consistently try to take advantage of these provocations, and has to focus its energy upon 
ending the North’s threat. Taken together, understanding how North Korea selects its 
antagonism is a valuable first step to establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The security situation of the two countries since the war has been one long 
sequence of crises. The North and the South have developed and maintained operational 
plans that regard each other as an enemy; as a result, each continually increases its 
military strength in order to defeat the other. Moreover, not only the two Koreas but also 
several great powers like the United States, China, Japan, and Russia have had repeated 
fierce power contests and diplomatic competitions in this small territory. Collectively, 
these nations maintain more than 6,850,000 troops by means of $889 billion in defense 
spending, which makes up most of the world’s total.1 Of course, Pyongyang sometimes 
reduces the number and intensity of its provocations and actively participates in talks 
with the international community, in a mood of reconciliation. Even at these times, 
however, the major operative premise is that the security environment of the peninsula is 
basically a crisis. 
Therefore, this research, on the basis of the hypothesis that the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has perceived its security environment as a 
1 Kang-nyung Kim, “Change of the Northeast Asia’s Security Environment and Korea’s Defense 
Policy Issues,” Northeast Asia Studies 26, no. 1 (2011): 56. 
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perpetual crisis since the end of the Korean War, will seek to determine the patterns by 
which the North chooses provocation types, by applying existing models of crisis policy 
making. The basis for this approach is that, as mentioned above, the tense situation of the 
two Koreas arrayed against each other has been treated as an endless crisis by North 
Korea. Furthermore, the North’s endemic problems (such as distrust toward the regime, 
widespread starvation, and condemnation from the international community), which have 
continued since the establishment of the socialist rule, have continuously aggravated the 
regime’s mindset of perpetual crisis. In conclusion, with the hypothesis that Pyongyang’s 
situational awareness of constant crisis has affected its choice of the types of 
provocations it would undertake against Seoul, this thesis will generate new insights into 
North Korean behavior by applying models of crisis policy making to better understand 
the North’s decision making in continually undertaking provocations against South Korea. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will form the theoretical framework that can be applied to 
this paper, by looking into several previous lines of research. To accomplish this purpose, 
at first, it reviews two existing studies on North Korea’s threat and survival and identifies 
their limitations. After that, it analyzes two lines of research about the model of crisis 
policy making and describes the two major considerations of policy making: decisive 
factors (independent variable) and types of policies (dependent variable). 
1. Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang’s Study on North Korea’s Nuclear 
Issue 
Cha and Kang, by exchanging contrasting views on the North Korean nuclear 
issue, try to reach a concerted conclusion about how the United States should deal with 
the crisis wisely. Especially in the first chapter, Cha borrows the logic of preemptive and 
preventive action from international relations theory in order to answer the question of 
why Pyongyang has been continuing its suicidal attacks without judging the 
consequences rationally. He argues that the North’s dangerous behavior is based on its 
rational calculation that committing a provocation will be cheaper than achieving peace. 
Therefore, he adds that Pyongyang can rationally decide to cause a conflict even when 
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there is no chance of winning. By using this analysis, he concludes that Washington, 
Tokyo, and Seoul have to take an engagement policy instead of an isolation strategy.2 
Cha and Kang’s work suggests the practical foreign policy toward North Korea 
that the United States should adopt to resolve, not only the nuclear crisis, but also the 
overall North Korean questions. Furthermore, their opposing analyses and refutations of 
each other’s views provide diverse perspectives on understanding the issues plaguing the 
Korean Peninsula. Although their collaboration offers the rational logic that has made 
Pyongyang keep threatening Seoul despite the expected risk, it cannot properly explain 
the relations between the logic and the types of threats. In other words, their idea needs to 
be developed further to let people understand why North Korea committed certain types 
of threatening behaviors in certain situations. 
2. Young Whan Kihl’s Study on North Korea’s Survival Strategy 
Kihl’s research aims to discover how North Korea could survive without 
collapsing or changing like other socialist states. First, in respect to the economy, 
Pyongyang, which had faced dire economic circumstances and chronic food shortage 
after Kim Il-sung’s death, attempted to conduct a limited economic reform and 
modernization movement, “Building Kangsong Taeguk,” modeled on China’s reform and 
opening up. Second, politically, Kim Jong-il could sustain the regime’s stability by 
smoothing the hereditary succession and tightening his grip on party and military. Third, 
in diplomacy, Pyongyang tried to secure an equal footing with other powers at the 
negotiating table by using nuclear brinkmanship and other provocations. Lastly, in the 
mental aspect, the North’s deep-rooted philosophy of Juche, traditional isolationism, and 
self-righteous tendency made it easy to control the people’s thinking compulsorily.3 In 
sum, the author concludes that North Korea’s innovative change or abject collapse would 
be far into the future because of these self-help efforts and national characteristics. 
2 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 18–20. 
3 Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 3–20. 
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Kihl provides useful background knowledge for understanding the diverse causes 
of the Kim regime’s survival. He tries to find the North’s unique strategy for maintaining 
its regime by comparing it with other socialist-bloc countries that have either collapsed or 
changed their policies. Especially, by highlighting the North’s attempts for limited 
changes and its unique mindset, which were neglected in the existing Korean studies, he 
can thoroughly explain the basis of the regime’s continued existence. Nevertheless, his 
study leaves something to be desired. For instance, there is no definite explanation about 
the underlying motives of the North’s policies for its survival. Plus, he does not deal in 
depth with whether the North’s persistent provocations have contributed to its survival; 
nor does he discuss what mechanism Pyongyang uses to decide upon its methods of 
intimidation. 
3. Yong-pil Lee’s Study on the Decisive Factors of Policy Making in a 
Crisis 
By presenting a general model of crisis policy making, the author insists that the 
three decisive factors (crisis event, international context, and domestic context) affect 
policy makers’ choices in a crisis. First, a crisis event refers to the unexpected 
consequence of behaviors (one’s own or those of one’s opponent) that cause a crisis in a 
stable condition. This event threatens core values of organizations, limits reaction times, 
and makes it hard to predict the future. Second, an international context consists of the 
past, present, and future global environments, as well as relations with an opponent that 
influence the international awareness of crises. It involves international politics, opinions, 
dynamics, and geopolitical factors. Lastly, a domestic context is made up of national 
values, conditions, and trends affecting an interpretation of a crisis event, and involves 
domestic politics, military and economic conditions, ideology, and perceptions of 
national security.4 
On the basis of his three independent variables, the decisive factors can be 
grouped into four main elements: regime stability, relations with China and the Soviet 
Union (Russia), military strength, and economic power. These elements drive regime 
4 Yong-pil Lee, Crisis Management: Theories and Cases (Seoul: Ingansarang, 1992), 186–198. 
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decision making. First, since regime stability is of the utmost importance to Pyongyang, 
all threats that cause political instability are regarded as crisis events. Thus, crises start 
from any event that threatens the survival of the regime, and the Northern response is 
based on perceptions of that event. Second, relations with China and the Soviet Union 
(Russia) work as decisive factors that form an international context. Though the North’s 
public relations with these countries have been diminished as consequences of China’s 
reform and opening up and the Soviets’ collapse, these two communist allies’ roles have 
had dominant impacts on the North’s international context since its foundation. Lastly, in 
terms of a domestic context, military strength and economic power are the essential 
factors that decide the diversity and intensity of crisis management policies and affect the 
overall level of awareness about a crisis through the comparison with South Korea. In 
conclusion, these four specified factors can be utilized in this research, which analyzes 
the North’s reasons for provocation. 
4. Alexander L. George’s Study on the Types of Crisis Management 
Strategy 
The author, through an analysis of historical cases and empirical studies, gives 
several concrete examples of crisis management strategy. Policy making in a crisis, 
unlike other peaceful times, causes extreme stress and pressure for political leaders by 
requiring them to expand their roles abruptly and react urgently. Therefore, to overcome 
the crisis effectively, policy makers should conceive and prepare many contingency 
strategies in advance, by considering all factors that influence the situation. To support 
this point, George examines the U.S. and Soviet strategies that were employed to avoid 
entering a war during a series of tense confrontations in the Cold War (in Berlin, Cuba, 
Asia, and the Middle East). By using this analysis, he categorizes the strategies into two 
major types: offensive strategies for changing a status quo and defensive strategies for 
blocking a change.5 
Offensive crisis management strategies are established for the purpose of altering 
the current situation by threatening an adversary’s interest. These strategies intend to 
5 Alexander L. George, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1991), 377–378. 
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compel obedience from an opponent and prevent the expansion of a crisis by presenting 
an aggressive act, so that one side can resolve a fundamental political dilemma by 
creating a favorable environment even when the opponent is holding a dominant position. 
However, if the challenger’s blackmail, intimidation, and warning exceed the adversary’s 
acceptance level of risk, those strategic activities can elevate the crisis. Moreover, since 
these strategies usually depend on a subjective evaluation of force differentials, an 
elaborate observation of the adversary and a sober assessment of the situation are 
essential. Offensive strategies include blackmail; a limited, reversible probe; controlled 
pressure; fait accompli; and attrition.6 
Defensive crisis management strategies are planned to protect the actor’s initial 
interest and deter an unwanted war when the response to impede the adversary’s effort to 
change the situation is likely to heighten a crisis. These strategies start from the 
estimation that an excessive use of force and a hostile response to diffuse a crisis can 
exacerbate the problem, so it would be better to prevent the crisis from worsening by 
using some indirect methods such as diplomatic negotiation, limited response, expression 
of will, and test of capabilities. Overly defensive gestures excluding physical responses, 
however, can encourage the opponent’s aggressive tendency and make the actor neglect 
the importance of military buildup to prepare for the worst. Defensive strategies include 
coercive diplomacy, limited escalation coupled with deterrence of counterescalation, tit-
for-tat coupled with deterrence of escalation by the opponent, test of capabilities coupled 
with deterrence of escalation by the opponent, drawing a line, conveying commitment 
and resolve to avoid miscalculation by the adversary, and buying time to explore a 
negotiated settlement. 7  All offensive and defensive crisis management strategies are 
summarized in Table 1. 
  
6 George, Avoiding War, 379–383. 
7 Ibid., 383–393. 
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· Demand the adversary give up something on pain of suffering 
serious damage if it refuses 
· Try to achieve a gain without using force 
Limited 
Probe 
· Uncertain whether the adversary hopes to change the status quo 
· Initiate a probing action to detect the adversary’s intention 
Controlled 
Pressure 
· Confident that the adversary wants to defend the status quo 
· Try to alter the status quo by employing low-level option, 
which is difficult for the adversary to counter 
Fait 
Accompli 
· Confident that the adversary does not want to defend the 
position under dispute 
· Believe that the gains outweigh the losses 
· Take quick and decisive action to alter the status quo 
Attrition 
· Unfavorable conditions for using other offensive strategies 
· Adopt a guerrilla or terrorist form of attrition strategy to wear 







· Employ threats of force or quite limited increments of force 
· Persuade the adversary to cease its provocative behavior 
Limited 
Escalation 
· Try to alter the ground rules to obtain more favorable terms for 
crisis bargaining 
· Engage in limited and selective escalation 
Tit-for-Tat 
· Carry out carefully measured tit-for-tat reprisals for the 
provocations of the adversary 
· Choose reprisals according to the severity of the provocations 
Test of 
Capabilities 
· Too risky and politically unacceptable to use the strategy of 
limited escalation to secure more favorable ground 
· Accept a test of capabilities within the framework of the 
disadvantageous ground rules and limitations 
Drawing 
a Line 
· Define what action by the adversary would provoke a response 





· Confident that the adversary wants to alter the status quo 
· Convey commitment and resolution to oppose any forthcoming 
provocation and avoid a miscalculation by the adversary 
Buying 
Time 
· Confident that the adversary wants to alter the status quo 
· Try to buy time in order to explore the possibility of mutually 
acceptable negotiated settlement 
Table 1.   Offensive and Defensive Crisis Management Strategies8 
8 George, Avoiding War, 379–392. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The analytical framework of this thesis is composed of the logical processes to 
figure out the patterns of North Korea’s choice of provocation forms and predict future 
threats by applying existing models of crisis policy making. To support this, the probable 
structure of the North’s policy making is inferred through the literature review in Section 
D of this chapter. The decisive factors are military strength, relations with China and the 
Soviet Union (Russia), regime stability, and economic power; and the examples 
suggested by George can be adopted to analyze the North’s previous provocative acts. 
The second stage analyzes the North’s significant provocations after the war and divides 
them into three periods according to their shapes and characteristics. The third stage 
evaluates Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign situation during each period, by using the 
four decisive factors specified above, and then tries to find a correlation with the North’s 
actual policies in selecting its provocations. The last stage confirms whether there are 
noteworthy patterns in this correlation, and draws the inferences that are useful to predict 
the future provocation types of North Korea. 
This research utilizes diverse primary and secondary sources, according to the 
stage in question. The first stage used the sources discussed in the literature review in 
Section D, and the second stage uses South Korea’s latest Defense White Paper and the 
U.S. Congressional Research Service reports to seek the records of the North’s 
provocations. The third and fourth stages deal with the government documents, academic 
books, and scholarly journals that assess the domestic and overseas circumstances of 
Pyongyang. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains six chapters. This first chapter introduces the study’s research 
question, importance, hypothesis, literature review, and methods to suggest the purpose 
and structure of the thesis. Chapter II verifies that there have been obvious differences in 
the targets, scale, and methods of the North’s provocations, and classifies their types by 
time period. On the basis of this division, Chapters III-V analyze each period’s decisive 
factors that affected North Korea’s policy making in a crisis by focusing on finding the 
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correlation with the North’s real provocations. These chapters, especially, utilize the 
basic structure of crisis policy making derived from the literature review, with the 
hypothesis that the Kim regime has perceived its security environment as a crisis. Lastly, 
Chapter VI, by summing up the results of the study and figuring out the existence of 
useful patterns, suggests the policy implications for the U.S. and South Korean 
governments. 
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II. CLASSIFICATION OF THE TYPES OF PROVOCATIONS 
This chapter clarifies which threatening actions of North Korea are provocations 
against the Republic of Korea (ROK), and classifies the types of provocations by time 
period and according to the similarities of major cases after the Korean War. Analyzing 
successfully the patterns of the North’s choice of provocation forms, which is the 
ultimate objective of this thesis, requires investigation of how the political, economic, 
and diplomatic circumstances that Pyongyang faced in each period influenced its crisis 
policy making, and how those influences drew particular types of provocations. 
Therefore, the core process required prior to all of these studies is to verify whether there 
have been noteworthy similarities in the provocations within specific spans of time, and 
to divide the periods if the similarities are traceable. Through this process, studying the 
common characteristics of provocations in each period helps to form the basic framework 
to research the patterns of the North’s decisions on the types of its provocations. 
The division of Korea for half a century, which has no parallel in the world, has 
itself the huge possibility of causing endless conflicts between the North and the South. 
Though full-scale war or military conquest have become far less likely, the number and 
intensity of limited conflicts have not diminished. Moreover, Pyongyang continues to 
carry out adventurous military actions, against all common sense and despite its 
considerable disadvantages (e.g., severe resource shortfalls, oppressive international 
sanctions, and the strong Korea-U.S. alliance).9 For example, “from 1954 to 1992, North 
Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed agents into South Korea,” and 
“it has planned and attempted to assassinate the ROK president in 1968, 1970, 1974, 
1981, and 1983.” 10  These continuous, unpredictable threats have created successive 
crises and an unstable security environment in the South, while the North has been able to 
achieve its intended goals and interests by committing these constant provocations. 
9 Ha-yoon Seong, “Study on the Cause of North Korean Military Provocations: Focusing on the 
Bombardment to Yeonpyeong Island” (Master’s thesis, Korea University, 2012), 2. 
10  Fischer, Hannah, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007, CRS Report RL30004 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 1; Robert M. Collins, “North Korea’s Strategy 
of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line,” in Confronting Security Challenges on the 
Korean Peninsula, ed. Bruce E. Bechtol (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011), 16. 
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All the conflicts caused by inter-Korean confrontation, however, cannot be 
defined as provocations. For example, the minor violations of the Armistice Agreement, 
nonstrategic military maneuvers, or ordinary propaganda are the kinds of things that 
escalate tension on the peninsula, but which are not regarded as actions that severely 
threaten the South’s security. Thus, it is required to define the North’s provocations 
clearly to sort out the cases of threatening actions appropriate to this thesis. In this 
context, Robert M. Collins insists that Pyongyang has employed diverse provocations, 
which involved limited and selective use of force, to achieve its political/military 
objectives by countering the superior diplomatic-economic advances of Seoul. 11  In 
addition to this, Congressional Research Service, in its report in 2007, lists the cases of 
North Korean provocative actions as follows: 
armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and 
spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism including assassination and 
bombing; threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, 
and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean 
government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; 
and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.12 
Taken together, the North’s provocations can be defined as all the military and 
nonmilitary actions, other than war, that threaten the South’s security by raising tension 
in the region and inducing fear of war. The general status of provocations from 1954 to 
2010, sorted by applying the definition, is summed up in Table 2. 
  
11 Collins, “North Korea’s Strategy,” 14–15. 
12 Fischer, Hannah, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1. 
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Classification Number of Cases Description 
Infiltrations Approx. 1,640 · 720 cases by land · 920 cases by sea 
Local 
provocations Over 1,020 
· 470 cases by land 
(90 cases of shooting and artillery fire, 
70 cases of raids and abductions, etc.) 
 
· 510 cases by sea 
(490 cases of naval ship/fishing boats 
crossing the border, 20 naval 
engagements) 
 
· 40 cases by air 
(20 cases of infiltrations into South 
Korean airspace, 10 cases of missile 
launches, etc.) 
Table 2.   General Status of Provocations (1954-November 2010)13 
To proceed efficiently, this thesis focuses only on the major cases listed above, 
those which caused serious damage to the South and involved prominent characteristics. 
They are arranged chronologically in Table 3. As shown in the table, North Korea has 
conducted a diverse range of provocations, from shootings by individuals to premeditated 
assassination attempts on presidents, terrorist attacks with veiled attackers, clandestine 
military raids, and illegal infiltrations into inland areas. These provocations, in other 
words, have never shared one characteristic in common, but varied in their targets, scale, 
and methods. Moreover, these different characteristics have shown noticeable similarities 
within specific spans of time, and those patterns have also changed with the periods. 
Table 3 groups these different characteristics of the major cases into three 
categories. The first category, “War-risk,” is defined as the boldness and aggressiveness 
to accept the risk of war. The second category, “Terror,” is defined as the intention to 
give a significant shock to the enemy through a terrorist attack. The third category, 
“Maritime,” is defined as the tendency to provoke a calculated military conflict at sea. 
13 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of 
National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2011), 314. 
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Classification Description Category 
War-Risk Terror Maritime 
February 16, 
1958 
South’s commercial airliner on domestic 
flight from Busan to Seoul with 34 passengers 
aboard hijacked by North Korean agent (only 
26 sent back to South on March 6, 1958) 
 ⃝  
January 14, 
1964 
ROK F-86D fighter on training mission 
crossed into North’s airspace due to radio 
malfunction and was shot down (North 
returned pilot’s body on January 17, 1964) 
⃝   
January 19, 
1967 
North’s coastal artillery deployed along East 
Coast fired on and sank ROK PCE-56 
Dangpo while it guarded fishing vessels (39 
crew members killed and 12 severely wounded) 
  ⃝ 
January 21, 
1968 
31 commandos from North’s 124th Unit 
mounted assault near Cheongwadae, 
residence of South’s president (29 killed, one 
caught, and one escaped) 
⃝   
January 23, 
1968 
USS Pueblo, U.S. Naval intelligence ship, 
captured by North in international waters (all 
crew members, except for one who was killed, 
returned home on December 23, 1968) 
⃝   
October 30, 
1968 
120 armed members from North’s Special 
Forces infiltrated Uljin and Samcheok (107 
killed, seven caught, and six escaped) 
⃝   
April 15, 
1969 
U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane was shot 
down while carrying out a reconnaissance 
mission above international waters southeast 
of Cheongjin (all 31 crew members killed) 
⃝   
June 22, 
1970 
Accidental detonation of explosive planted on 
roof of entrance to National Cemetery in 
Seoul (one agent killed and two escaped) 
 ⃝  
August 15, 
1974 
Mun Se-kwang, pro-Pyongyang resident from 
Japan, attempted to assassinate President 
Park Chung-hee in Seoul’s National Theater 
during ceremony commemorating liberation 
(first lady Yuk Yeong-su killed) 
 ⃝  
August 18, 
1976 
Axe murder incident at Panmunjom (two U.S. 
officers hacked to death and four U.S. enlisted 
men and four KATUSA soldiers injured) 
⃝   
July 14, 
1977 
U.S. CH-47 strayed into North’s airspace 
near east coast and was shot down (three U.S. 
servicemen killed and one survivor returned) 
⃝   
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Classification Description War-Risk Terror Maritime 
October 9, 
1983 
The explosion of a bomb, several minutes 
before President Chun Doo-hwan was to 
arrive at the Martyr’s Mausoleum in 
Rangoon, Burma (17 senior officials killed) 
 ⃝  
December 3, 
1983 
North’s spy ship caught and sunk while trying 
to infiltrate beach in Dadaepo, Busan (two 
crew members caught) 
  ⃝ 
September 14, 
1986 
Arrival area of Gimpo Airport partially 
destroyed by explosives (five civilians killed 
and 33 wounded) 
 ⃝  
January 15, 
1987 
Fishing vessel Dongjin-ho with 12 fishermen 
aboard hijacked forcefully while fishing in 
international waters off Baengnyeong Island 
 ⃝  
November 29, 
1987 
Korean Air flight KAL 858 blown up in 
midair by North’s agents (all 115 aboard 
killed) 
 ⃝  
January 28, 
1989 
Fishing vessels No. 37 Taeyang-ho with 12 
fishermen aboard and No. 38 Taeyang-ho 
with 10 fishermen aboard hijacked forcefully 
while fishing in international waters 
 ⃝  
September 2, 
1995 
Two agents from North’s Workers’ Party 
infiltrated beach in Onpyeong-ri, Jeju Island  ⃝  
April 5, 
1996 
North’s soldiers, estimated between one or 
two companies, demonstrated military power 
in the Joint Security Area at Panmonjom 
⃝   
September 16, 
1996 
Sango-class submarine from North’s 
Reconnaissance Bureau captured while 
infiltrating beach in Daepodong, Gangneung 
(one caught, 13 killed, 11 committed suicide, 
and one submarine captured) 
  ⃝ 
August 2, 
1997 
Two agents from North’s Workers’ Party 
infiltrated beach in Galgot-ri, Geoje Island  ⃝  
October 17, 
1997 
Two Southern residents in Daeseongdong 
Village close to border taken to North while 
working in field (returned to South on October 
20, 1997) 
 ⃝  
June 21, 
1998 
Yogo-class submarine from North’s Workers’ 
Party captured while infiltrating beach in 
Yangyang-gun, Gangwon-do (all nine aboard 
committed suicide and one submarine captured) 
  ⃝ 
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Classification Description War-Risk Terror Maritime 
November 20, 
1998 
A small speed boat from North’s Workers’ 
Party attempted to infiltrate beach in Seonsu-
ri, Ganghwa Island but fled when spotted 
  ⃝ 
December 17, 
1998 
North’s submersible boat sunk while trying to 
infiltrate beach in Dolsan Island, Yeosu 
(bodies of six crew members recovered and one 
submersible boat captured) 
  ⃝ 
June 15, 
1999 
1st Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign broke out 
after North’s patrol boat crossed NLL and 
started to shoot at ROK navy ships 
  ⃝ 
June 29, 
2002 
2nd Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign broke out 
after North’s patrol boat crossed NLL and 
launched surprise attack on ROK navy ships 
  ⃝ 
November 10, 
2009 
Daecheong Naval Campaign broke out after 
North’s patrol boat crossed NLL and 
launched surprise attack on ROK navy ships 
  ⃝ 
March 26, 
2010 
ROK Ship Cheonan, from the 2nd Fleet, sunk 
by North’s torpedo attack 2.5km south of 
Baengnyeong Island (46 crew members killed) 
  ⃝ 
November 23, 
2010 
Coastal artillery guns and multiple rocket 
launchers of North’s 4th Corps fired shells at 
Yeonpyeong Island (two soldiers and two 
civilians killed and 16 soldiers and many 
civilians wounded) 
  ⃝ 
Table 3.   Major Provocations Against South Korea14 
Although the types of provocations during particular periods are not completely 
identical, given the rough and broad similarities of their characteristics, the North’s 
provocations after the war can be divided into three periods. First, in the early postwar 
years, Pyongyang, without hesitating to wage war, carried out ruthless surprise attacks 
against Seoul in various places involving air, sea, and land. The typical examples of this 
period were the raid on Cheongwadae, the Pueblo incident, and the Uljin and Samcheok 
armed infiltrations, all of which occurred in 1968. These provocations caused huge losses 
of both life and property by applying relatively large-scale military tools in unimaginable 
14 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper, 314–315. 
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manners, and even targeted U.S. forces on occasion. In sum, the Kim regime intended to 
undermine the ROK and U.S. governments and induce their extensive responses by 
employing those daring provocative actions, any of which could have escalated into all-
out war. 
Second, between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, the number of terrorist attacks on 
air and land that posed a threat to the South’s leadership and bolstered social unrest 
increased remarkably. For example, the assassination attempt on President Park in 1974, 
the Rangoon bomb blast in 1983, and the bombing of KAL 858 in 1987 were the most 
vicious terrorist attacks in this period. The Kim regime chose terrorism as a mean of 
provocation to administer overwhelming physical and psychological shocks to the South 
and achieve its political goals without causing a war crisis. As a result, the agents, 
intentions, and objectives of these provocations were hard to discern immediately, and 
sometimes the South Korean government could not even respond or retaliate against the 
incidents because they took place overseas through various channels. Indeed, Pyongyang 
completely utilized the exceptional advantages of terrorism while Seoul became a victim 
of those merciless attacks. 
Third, after the mid-1990s, North Korea executed meticulously planned limited 
military actions such as infiltration, raid, and engagement, and those were gradually 
concentrated on the sea. The first and second Yeonpyeong Naval Campaigns in 1999 and 
2002, the sinking of the ROK vessel Cheonan in 2010, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong 
Island in 2010 were the major maritime provocations of this period. Because the two 
Koreas have not reached an agreement on the Northern Limited Line of the sea area, their 
naval powers have been operating in close proximity to one another, without any buffer 
zone between them. Therefore, the North’s forces could provoke military clashes easily 
in this area, and it was also easy to legitimize their provocations by attributing all the 
causes to the South. These are the reason why the sea was spotlighted as the main place 
of provocations in this period. Though these physical provocations involved the 
possibility of causing war in the peninsula ultimately, the North Korean regime deterred 
the expansion of crises by concealing and denying its commitment of provocations or 
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shifting the blame onto the South. This periodic division of the North’s provocations is 
summarized in Table 4. 
 




· Raid on Cheongwadae (January 21, 1968) 
 
· Pueblo Incident (January 23, 1968) 
 




· Assassination Attempt on President Park 
(August 15, 1974) 
 
· Rangoon Bomb Blast (October 9, 1983) 
 
· Bombing of KAL 858 (November 29, 1987) 
Period of Provoking 
Maritime Conflict 
(mid-1990s–present) 
· Yeonpyeong Naval Campaigns 
(June 15, 1999 and June 29, 2002) 
 
· Sinking of Cheonan (March 26, 2010) 
 
· Shelling of Yeonpyeong (November 23, 2010) 
Table 4.   Periodic Division of Provocations 
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III. PERIOD OF TRIGGERING WAR: AFTER WAR TO 1960S 
Because the three years of the Korean War caused enormous damage to the two 
Koreas, they had to focus on restoring the damage and stabilizing domestic situations. 
Since they pursued very different ideologies as their ruling principles, they came to 
regard their survival and prosperity as intimately linked to showing which ideology was 
superior to the other. This mindset mirrored the larger trend of the Cold War system. 
Thus, Pyongyang was forced to make the optimal decisions that could effectively turn 
this unstable and competitive situation in its favor. 
According to this situational condition, North Korea conducted large-scale 
military provocations with unprecedented boldness and brutality from the end of the war 
to the late 1960s. This active and aggressive tendency was encouraged by the North’s 
confidence, and stemmed from its relatively superior economic and military power 
compared to its disastrously ruined adversary. Moreover, the regime stability achieved by 
Kim Il-sung’s absolute dictatorship and the practical profits from the diplomacy with 
China and the Soviet Union also contributed to this tendency. Kim, therefore, could carry 
out the powerful provocations that could escalate to war if the South chose retaliation 
against them. These audacious movements suggest that he intended to place the blame for 
war on Seoul, in case of all-out war. In this context, this chapter analyzes the four 
decisive factors of policy making on the basis of the idea that these typical characteristics 
of provocations in this period were formed by the North’s crisis policy-making process. 
A. MILITARY STRENGTH 
Since the top priority of the North Korean regime during the 1950s was to set up 
the basic structure of the state as soon as possible, it placed more importance on 
economic recovery and political stability than military buildup. This, however, does not 
mean that the North’s military strength in this period had not been improved. Although 
the North Korean leadership’s concern concentrated mainly on facing political and 
economic issues, the enormous amount of aid and assistance from its two socialist allies 
developed the Korean People’s Army (KPA) considerably. For example, thanks to the 
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Chinese forces, which had been stationed in North Korea until October 1958 and 
maintained a combined command system with the KPA, the Kim regime could devote its 
energies to economic development without the pressures associated with establishing 
advanced military capabilities on its own. 
Furthermore, the mass introduction of arms from the Soviet Union played an 
important role in achieving the qualitative evolution of the KPA. Between 1951 and 1956, 
about 2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns (such as T-54, IS-2, ISU-122, and SU-100) 
were provided to North Korea by the Soviet forces. Over the same period, Kim also 
received 800 Soviet aircraft, including fighters such as the MiG-15, MiG-17, and Yak-9 
as well as interceptors, bombers, and helicopters.15 This reinforcement of air power and 
introduction of advanced weapons led to the marked progress of the KPA, and formed the 
essential foundation for its conventional military strength. 
From the 1960s on, however, North Korea started to pursue its own military 
buildup policies. The reason for this change was that the security vacuum created by the 
withdrawal of the Chinese forces in the late 1950s, and the establishment of the South 
Korean military regime in 1961, was perceived as an obvious crisis to the Kim regime. 
Moreover, as Pyongyang adopted a pro-China line during the Sino-Soviet dispute, the 
Soviet Union cut off its military assistance to the KPA. This meant that North Korea had 
to develop a self-reliant defense capability from 1962 onward. 16  In addition, the 
formation of the U.S.-Japan-ROK military alliance system following the normalization of 
diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965, and the worsening of the 
Sino-DPRK relations by the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966, increased the North’s 
need for independent military buildup. While these internal defense capabilities 
developed in the DPRK, the ROK weakened its defense posture somewhat by the 
dispatch of troops to the Vietnam War. This reality could be perceived as a favorable 
opportunity for North Korea to conquer the South by force. The DPRK’s new defense 
15 Kwang-soo Kim, “The Establishment and Development of the Korean People’s Army, 1945–1990,” 
in The Military of North Korea: A New Look, ed. University of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam 
University (Seoul: Hanul, 2006), 114. 
16 Dae-sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), 203–210. 
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policies reflecting these diverse situational perceptions were initiated by the Economy 
and Military Catching-up Line and 4 Main Military Line, which were adopted by the 
Central Committee (CC) of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in December 1962.17 
The North’s defense spending and large regular forces that increased markedly 
during the 1960s were the tangible proof of these military buildup policies. Indeed, the 
percentage of defense spending as a share of the budget was 2.6 percent in 1961, 5.8 
percent in 1964, and 10 percent in 1966; finally; it reached and began to stay above 30 
percent from 1967 on. Due to this growing military investment, the Kim regime, since the 
mid-1960s, could maintain more than 440,000 regular troops (390,000 in the army, 
10,000 in the navy, and 38,000 in the air force). This rising trend of defense spending and 
the number of troops was clearly evident in the comparison with the ROK forces, as 
shown in Table 5.18 
Classifi- 
Cation 













Troops Defense Budget 
1953 59.1 120 27.5 ? 215 ? 
1955 72.0 100 41.0 ? 176 ? 
1960 60.0 153 39.0 150 154 100 
1965 60.4 114 41.1 260 147 42 
1969 64.5 300 46.7 680 138 44 
Table 5.   Comparison of the Military Strength of the Two Koreas (1953–1969)19 
17 Korean Central News Agency, Chosun Central Yearbook 1964 (Pyongyang: Korean Central News 
Agency, 1964), 4; Kim Il-sung, Kim Il Sung: Work 17 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1984), 372–386. 
18 The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, The Collection on North Korea (Seoul: The Institute for Far 
Eastern Studies, 1974), 51. Ibid., Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea: Continuity 
and Change (Seoul: Hanul, 2005), 133. 
19 Taik-young Hamm, Political Economy of National Security: State Power and Armament of the Two 
Koreas (Seoul: Bobmunsa, 1998), 152–153; Taik-young Hamm, “State Power and Armament of the Two 
Koreas: A Case Study” (Doctoral thesis, University of Michigan, 1996), 107–135. 
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These massed military forces were organized to wage all types of war (e.g., 
regular war, unconventional war, modern war, and guerrilla war). For starters, the ground 
forces had three front corps and two rear corps, organized into 19 infantry divisions and 
seven infantry brigades, and they also maintained separate commands such as a 
mechanized command equipped with the latest tanks and self-propelled guns and an 
artillery command equipped with field artillery and anti-aircraft guns. The DPRK navy, 
though the majority of its assets were small vessels, already had four submarines and 
maintained four naval bases and 20 squadrons. The air force was organized into four 
fighter wings and one anti-aircraft artillery unit, and also possessed a large number of 
advanced fighters, including 56 MiG-21, through the steady modernization of equipment 
from the 1950s. Furthermore, the KPA sought to militarize the whole society by 
establishing several reserve troops such as the Worker and Peasant Red Guard in 1957, 
Reserve Military Training Unit in 1962, and Red Youth Guard in 1970.20 
In sum, the Chinese and Soviet military assistance and the North’s self-reliant 
military buildup policies, which were conducted in earnest during the 1950s and the 
1960s, achieved substantial results despite the adverse political and economic 
environment after the war. Though the North’s objective number of troops was inferior to 
that of the ROK troops, the Kim regime could hold the lead in military strength by using 
its outstanding qualitative superiority. 
B. RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
From the end of the war to the late 1960s, North Korea’s overall foreign policies 
can be summarized as the change from socialist states’ encampment diplomacy to 
independent and multilateral diplomacy. During the era of encampment diplomacy, the 
priority goal of the North’s diplomacy was to secure, from the socialist world, sufficient 
aid for postwar recovery, so the Kim regime promoted its foreign policy under the 
definite influence of the socialist superpowers. 21  After that, as its national power 
20  Chun-sung Cho, The North (Seoul: Koryo, 1969), 199–202. Ibid., Kwang-soo Kim, “The 
Establishment and Development of the Korean People’s Army,” 140. 
21 Kyu-sup Jeong, North Korea’s Foreign Policy: Past and Present (Seoul: Ilshinsa, 1997), 25. 
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gradually recovered, it developed a self-reliant position and implemented independent 
diplomacy to avoid external intervention, and also pursued multilateral diplomacy to 
form broad and comprehensive foreign relations. 
During the 1950s, socialist states’ encampment diplomacy, which was the 
outcome of ideological conflicts spanning most of the globe during the Cold War, was 
stably maintained in North Korea. Yet, since these dependent foreign relations could be 
easily swayed by the influence of great powers, their eternal stability was fundamentally 
uncertain. Indeed, the Kim regime was placed in an embarrassing diplomatic situation 
because of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, which had been sparked by the ideological dispute in 
the late 1950s. However, by implementing balanced foreign policies between the two 
giant powers, Pyongyang could take advantage of this confrontation and maximize its 
interests. For example, in July 1961, Kim negotiated and signed the Mutual Aid and 
Cooperation Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union and China, in succession. These 
treaties guaranteed one side’s unconditional military aid for the other side when the latter 
was involved in wars against third countries or unions.22 This encampment diplomacy, 
by settling the North’s security unstableness, created a favorable environment in which 
North Korea could build up national power, and Kim especially emphasized the nuclear 
deterrence capabilities provided by the Soviet Union as the major success of these 
relations.23 
The split of the socialist camp and precarious international situations in the 1960s, 
however, made Pyongyang shift to an independent and self-reliant diplomatic line. Many 
issues occurring around North Korea in this period contributed to this change in foreign 
policy. Kim, for example, criticized the Soviet revisionism that insisted on peaceful 
coexistence with America, and was wary of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON) that could make North Korea economically subordinate to the Soviet 
Union. In addition to this, Kim witnessed when Nikita Khrushchev condemned the 
Albanian regime’s cult of personality and withdrew diplomats in November 1961, and 
22 The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, The Collection on North Korea, 283–284. 
23 University of North Korean Studies, The Military of North Korea: A New Look, 128. 
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worried that the same accusation would be brought against him.24 Above all, the Soviet 
surrender to the United States in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis became the determining 
cause of the North’s anti-Soviet attitude, which finally caused Pyongyang to abandon 
encampment diplomacy and advocate a self-reliant foreign policy. 
The core agendas of this diplomatic self-reliance were the mutual respect and 
non-intervention between the socialist countries and the guarantee about their equality 
and autonomy. To realize these ideas, the DPRK, at the Second Party Representatives 
Conference in October 1966, formally declared the self-reliant diplomatic line, which has 
continued until now, by claiming complete equality and autonomy in foreign relations. 
Kim also pointed out that the primary cause of the division of the international 
communist movement was Soviet revisionism and Chinese doctrinism, and then 
emphasized that socialist countries should reject left and right opportunism in their lines 
to avoid diplomatic mistakes.25 In the same vein, Pyongyang expressed its strong support 
for the communist government in North Vietnam by criticizing the Soviet opportunistic 
and selfish behaviors that, Kim maintained, made the USSR hesitate in providing aid for 
Hanoi.26 
Beyond this, the Kim regime, on the basis of multilateral diplomacy, tried to 
establish broad foreign relations with diverse countries. In this context, the DPRK 
showed its intention to form economic and cultural relations with the countries having 
different social systems and ideologies, and continued to promote active foreign policies 
of engaging the Third World countries. Indeed, it put much effort into developing 
relations with capitalist countries including Japan, but made little progress.27 Rather, it 
reacted sensitively to the ROK-Japan Normalization Talks from 1961 to 1965 and 
denounced the restoration of their relations.28 
24 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 127. 
25 Kim Il-sung, Kim Il Sung: Work 20 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984), 319–
350 
26 Kyu-sup Jeong, North Korea’s Foreign Policy, 110. 
27 Korean Central News Agency, Chosun Central Yearbook 1964, 164; Korean Central News Agency, 
Chosun Central Yearbook 1965, 486. 
28 Korean Central News Agency, Chosun Central Yearbook 1962, 216. 
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After all, until the 1950s, the DPRK had been in a confused diplomatic situation 
due to the overlap between its dependent foreign policies and the collapse of the socialist 
camp. Through the neutral and calculated diplomatic strategy toward the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry, however, the Kim regime could obtain practical interests from both nations. On 
the other hand, from the 1960s, by pursuing an independent and self-reliant diplomatic 
line, it could deter external interference as well as establish itself as one of the sovereign 
countries against the prosperity of the liberalist camp. 
C. REGIME STABILITY 
In a continual struggle over ideology between North and South Korea, the 
decisive objective of both governments was to ensure regime stability, which could 
guarantee their survival. The 1950s and the 1960s, in particular, were the crucial periods 
for Kim, during which he could establish a foundation for dictatorship and strengthen his 
base of political support, which had been undermined by the failure of war. To achieve 
these goals, the Kim regime not only reformed its political structures through the 
sweeping purge against the opposition forces but also eliminated the Soviet and Chinese 
leverage over its domestic politics. In comparison with the South’s conflicting political 
situation, North Korea was in a stable circumstance once most of the regime-threatening 
elements were removed successfully. 
First, by purging the opposition politicians, Kim could evade his responsibility for 
the defeat in the war and reduce political challenges to the regime in advance. Of course, 
Kim had already seized the actual power of country and party before the war, but several 
opposition groups having different political tendencies and roots did exist among the 
leadership, and were threatening Kim’s position. Hence, he focused on minimizing their 
influence and authority during the war and then directly conducted massive purges after 
the war. For example, in early 1953, he purged Park Hun-young, who was the head of the 
South Korean Workers’ Party, under suspicion of spying for the United States; this 
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became a harbinger of the purge against the Soviet Faction and the Yenan Faction in 
August 1956.29 
Even after this, political conflicts with the opposition groups continued for a 
while, but Kim suppressed their efforts with tighter controls. For instance, the Yenan 
Faction criticized that Kim’s heavy industry-centered economic policy would lead to 
deterioration in light industry and agriculture, and the Soviet Faction also opposed the 
policy by noting the Soviet skeptical response. 30  Above this, these groups made 
continuous attacks against the regime’s cult of personality and the recession of people’s 
life, but Kim suppressed these criticisms successfully by purging about 80 key figures of 
the party, administration, and military after the August Factionalist Incident in 1956.31 
After this, in the 1960s, by giving high-ranking positions of the KWP to his supporters 
and military leaders who had fought together in the anti-Japanese movement, he could 
solidify his power base and promote military buildup policies at the same time. 
Secondly, deterring external interventions was also one of the foremost conditions 
for the Kim regime’s stability. The opposition groups, which had been actively involved 
in political activities from the beginnings of the regime, were the foreign-oriented 
political powers supporting the Soviet and Chinese interference. Moreover, those two 
nations’ military aid and assistance during the Korean War justified their leverage on the 
North’s domestic affairs. After witnessing the collapse of the socialist bloc, however, 
Kim began to make an effort to recover the regime’s sovereignty by phasing out its 
reliance on the two powers. For starters, he denounced the spoil of the ideology in the 
socialist powers through the anti-Stalin movement and then emphasized the necessity of 
self-reliant philosophy replacing foreign ideas.32 Accordingly, in May 1967, the Kim 
regime imposed its own socialist idea, the Juche ideology, which said that the Korean 
masses were the masters of the country’s development, with the intention of creating a 
29 Choeng Seong Chang, Ideology Et System En Coree Du Nord (Paris: L’HarmaHan, 1997), 86–135. 
Ibid., Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 110–111. 
30 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 111–112. 
31 Chong-Sik Lee, “Kim Il-Song of North Korea,” Asian Survey 7, no. 6 (1967): 379–382. 
32 Dongailbo, North Korea Viewed in Source Material, 1945–1988 (Seoul: Dongailbo, 1989), 145–
154. 
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single governing system in which one leader had all power of governing.33 Finally, all of 
these actions helped the DPRK achieve complete independence from the influence of 
foreign powers and become a stable, autonomous regime. 
On the other hand, the South’s political circumstance was fairly chaotic compared 
to the North’s prompt postwar recovery and successful ideological reform. Of course, the 
active economic and military assistance of the United States, which tried to guard the 
liberalist camp, made Syngman Rhee’s government gain effective defense capabilities 
and use them politically for the regime’s survival.34 He also could easily legitimize his 
rule by claiming the absolute governing principles: deterring communist expansion and 
protecting democracy. Yet, his illegal political activities and persistent factious quarrels 
gradually aggravated the regime’s instability. Finally, hoping to clean up this 
disorganized mess created by Rhee, Park Chung-hee brought himself into power under a 
military coup d’état on May 16, 1961. Despite this move, the fundamental stability of the 
South’s regime was getting harder to secure due to its move to military dictatorship and 
suppression of democracy. 
In sum, it can be concluded that Pyongyang gained ground in the competition for 
regime stability over its rival, Seoul. The Kim regime could eliminate the challenges 
from the opposition political groups through wholesale purges and separate from the 
Soviet and Chinese influence by establishing thee Juche ideology as its own socialist 
philosophy. Furthermore, this reinforcement of the political base and stabilization of the 
regime stood out vividly against the South’s unsuccessful political progress and 
squabbling elites. 
  
33 Korean Workers’ Party, The History of Korean Workers’ Party (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ 
Party Press, 1991), 431. 
34 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 117. 
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D. ECONOMIC POWER 
North Korea’s economic development after the war was gradually achieved by the 
socialist planned economy system. After experiencing the loss of infrastructure and 
growth engines during the war, Pyongyang proceeded with the three-year plan from 1954 
to 1956, seeking to rehabilitate its economy and return to the pre-war level. As a result of 
this plan, by 1956, the North’s industrial production increased 2.8 times compared to 
1953, with an annual growth rate of 41.7 percent, and also its grain production increased 
19 percent compared to 1949. The main cause of this initial success of the economic plan 
was the massive aid from the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European countries. This 
plan, by laying the solid foundation for a socialist economy, enabled the DPRK to 
perform successfully during the following plans.35 
The next economic plan, from 1957 to 1962, was the first five-year plan, which 
formed the root of the North’s planned economy system.36 This plan could gain strength 
and maximize its outcomes through the Kim regime’s massive manpower mobilization 
program, the Chollima Movement, which “aimed at tapping into the revolutionary fervor 
of the North Korean workers in order to increase output in all sectors of the economy.”37 
Because of this, North Korea could boost its economy above the level of the pre-war 
period and finalize its transformation into a stable socialist country having basic 
economic power. For example, during the first four years, the North’s industrial 
production increased 3.5 times, with an annual growth rate of 36.6 percent (power 
production 1.8 times, fuel production 2.8 times, machine production 4.7 times, and 
extractive industries 2.6 times).38 Finally, “the North Korean authorities proudly declared 
the achievement of the major targets of the five-year plan two years ahead of schedule.”39 
35 Doowon Lee, “Assessing North Korean Economic Reform: Historical Trajectory, Opportunities, 
and Constraints,” Pacific Focus 8, no. 2 (1993): 10–12. 
36 Chang-hee Kim, Understanding North Korean Policy and Society (Seoul: Bobmunsa, 2006), 83. 
37 Doowon Lee, “Assessing North Korean Economic Reform,” 13. 
38 Hak-joon Kim, Fifty Year History of North Korea (Seoul: Donga, 1995), 206–207. 
39 Doowon Lee, “Assessing North Korean Economic Reform,” 13. 
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After that, the Kim regime established the first seven-year plan of 1961 to 1967 at 
the 4th convention of the Workers’ Party in 1961. The major policy goals of this plan 
were to attain substantial promotion of heavy industry and overall improvement of 
people’s economy.40 In other words, he tried to build up a more advanced and affluent 
country on the basis of the strengthened material and technical foundation for socialism. 
Hence, the basic tasks of this plan were to improve productivity by revolutionizing all 
sectors of the people’s economy and lead them to enjoy the benefits of civilization by 
improving their life. To reflect these objectives, this plan was designed to take seven 
years instead of five years. 
This plan, however, inevitably had to be fixed as the need for military buildup 
was growing due to the rapidly changing world situations. The deteriorating Sino-Soviet 
rivalry, the progress of the Vietnam War, and the establishment of a military regime in 
South Korea were examples of the changing situation. In particular, Kim’s New Year 
message in 1965 and the Rodong Sinmun editorial in 1966, which said that economic 
development was delayed by military buildup, proved that this seven-year plan had been 
disrupted. Indeed, the North Korean regime modified the plan to strengthen both 
economy and military and worked hard to expand its military power by spending about 
30 percent of the entire budget on the military between 1967 and 1969.41 Thus, though 
this economic plan seemed to pursue the completion of industrialization and the 
achievement of a self-sustaining economy, it actually focused on constructing the 
industrial foundation that could physically support its 4 Main Military Line. 
Given its economic achievement, acquired through the socialist planned economy 
system during the 1950s and the 1960s, North Korea accomplished successful postwar 
recovery and built a solid economic foundation. These results were helped by the 
systematic economic development plans, preceded by the Soviet and Chinese security 
assistance and the state-led productivity drive such as the Chollima Movement. 
Pyongyang, though the aggravated security instability caused an additional investment in 
40 Ministry of Information, Republic of Korea, North Korea’s Economy and Life (Seoul: Ministry of 
Information, Republic of Korea, 1993), 36–37. 
41 In-hak Baek, “The Course of North Korean Socialism,” in North Korea’s Policy and Society, ed. 
Eun-ho Lee and Young-jae Kim (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1994), 169. 
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military buildup, enjoyed superior economic power over Seoul, which was suffering from 
social unrest and economic depression. The disparity in economic power between the two 
countries is as follows: 
 





(A) 1.35 1.67 1.95 2.32 2.88 
North 










(A) 76 90 94 96 107 
North 




131 106 69 54 55 
Table 6.   Comparison of GNP Per Capita of the Two Koreas (1953–1964)42 
E. CORRELATION WITH THE TYPE OF PROVOCATION 
If the major provocations of this period are considered, North Korea seemed to try 
to trigger the South Korean government by committing relatively threatening local 
provocations and challenging military actions. In other words, Kim intended to create an 
unstable condition, which could bring about a full-scale war on the peninsula, on the 
assumption that these unacceptable provocations might make Seoul respond aggressively 
and use force on its own or with Washington. This analysis of the North’s political 
intention during this period is supported by the aforementioned four decisive factors of 
policy making in a crisis. 
42 Korea Institute for National Unification, Comparison of National Power of the Two Koreas (Seoul: 
Korea Institute for National Unification, 1992), 233. 
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First, the socialist powers’ military assistance in the early postwar years and the 
North’s self-reliant military buildup from the 1960s qualitatively modernized and 
improved the KPA. The massive Soviet arms aid and the Chinese forces’ stationed in 
North Korea not only led to the KPA’s substantial growth but also helped Pyongyang 
concentrate on its postwar recovery. Although it experienced an abrupt security vacuum 
due to the split of the socialist camp, it could maintain superior military strength to the 
ROK forces by increasing its defense budget and reforming the military structure on the 
basis of its own military buildup policies and the 4 Main Military Line. 
Second, North Korea succeeded in maximizing its national interests under the 
influence of the socialist superpowers and being recognized as an autonomous sovereign 
country. The Soviet-Sino rivalry forced the Kim regime to make a strategic choice, but it 
strove to maintain the diplomatic balance between the two countries and derive benefit 
through the Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty with them. Furthermore, as 
the socialist camp started to collapse and the revisionism appeared in the socialist ideas, 
North Korea pursued self-reliant and multilateral diplomacy and secured international 
recognition for its national sovereignty. 
Third, Kim stabilized his dictatorship by purging the influential opposition groups 
and deterring the external political intervention. Some of the political forces, which had 
grown with Soviet or Chinese support in the formation of the regime, had dissenting 
views to Kim’s forceful ruling, and the regime’s political and economic dependence on 
the two socialist powers prevented it from exercising its authority. All of these potential 
vulnerabilities and threats, however, were eliminated effectively by the active political 
oppression and the establishment of the Juche idea, which is the North’s own socialist 
philosophy. 
Fourth, the DPRK accomplished phenomenal economic growth through the 
sequential economic development plans. Thanks to the economic and security assistance 
from the socialist camp, Pyongyang successfully completed its three-year plan and 
recovered to the pre-war economic level. Above all, following two economic plans from 
1957 to 1967, despite their partial modification caused by security issues, facilitated rapid 
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industrial growth and led to the overall increase of national wealth and technological 
progress. 
In summary, from the end of the Korean War until the late 1960s, North Korea 
achieved the positive outcomes it wanted in all aspects of military strength, relations with 
China and the Soviet Union, regime stability, and economic power. The practical foreign 
relations with the socialist powers and the solid Juche ideology assisted the Kim regime 
in maintaining political and diplomatic stability and repeating striking development in the 
fields of economy and military. On the other hand, the political situation of South Korea 
was precarious, and its defense capability was vulnerable due to the troop deployments to 
Vietnam. Indeed, the South’s absolute inferiority in both economy and military made the 
DPRK retain overall supremacy and strong self-confidence. 
Given these advantageous decisive factors, it can be concluded that the Kim 
regime applied the fait accompli strategy to determine its provocation type during this 
period. George, the originator of the theory, writes that the fait accompli strategy is an 
offensive crisis management strategy that the challengers try to adopt to change the status 
quo by using their overwhelming forces and taking quick, decisive actions when they 
have the confidence to finish engagements in a short period by making more gains than 
losses.43 In the same vein, North Korea chose drastic and threatening provocations on the 
basis of its sufficient confidence to bear and manage the South’s retaliation and resolve 
the unstable situation stemming from the division of Korea, and this policy making could 
be explained by the fait accompli strategy. Consequently, the North’s major provocations 
that realized this strategic decision were the raid on Cheongwadae, the Pueblo incident, 
and the Uljin and Samcheok armed infiltration in 1968; the correlation between the 
decisive factors and the provocation type is summarized in Figure 1. 
  
43 George, Avoiding War, 382–383. 
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IV. PERIOD OF COMMITTING TERROR: 1970S TO MID-1990S 
By the late 1960s, and despite the DPRK’s bold and brutal provocations, South 
Korea’s capabilities to react to them gradually improved. Rather than weakening the 
South, the North’s aggression served to strengthen it. In response to the ongoing military 
actions of Pyongyang, Washington allocated troops, originally earmarked for Vietnam, to 
South Korea again and pledged $100 million in military aid to the ROK forces.44 In 
addition, Seoul achieved unprecedented rapid economic growth, called the Miracle on the 
Han River, and dominated Pyongyang in the aspect of diplomatic power by successfully 
hosting major international events such as the Asian Games and the Olympic Games. 
Although North Korea firmly maintained the foundation of its dictatorship through 
continuous military buildup policies and Kim Il-sung’s monolithic ideology system, the 
South’s remarkable development and improved international position made Pyongyang 
reassess its crisis policy making. 
For those reasons, the North’s major provocations, since the 1970s, started to take 
the form of terrorism that could hinder the South’s economic growth and produce social 
disorder. Indeed, from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, large-scale military provocations 
seeking to trigger war decreased, whereas elaborately prepared terrorist attacks increased. 
This change in the type of provocation meant that the DPRK sought a new way of policy 
making to solve the increasing economic gap and the unfavorable international 
environment. Looked at pragmatically, this is not surprising. By committing terror, North 
Korea could, with a little effort damage the South’s global image and destroy its 
leadership without being easily detected. In this context, this chapter analyzes the 
correlation between the four decisive factors that Pyongyang faced during this period and 
its policy making that chose terrorism as its main mean of provocation. 
  
44 Yung-gap Cho, National Crisis Management Theory, 351–352 
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A. MILITARY STRENGTH 
North Korea consistently implemented military buildup policies with a strong will. 
Kim stressed prompt, mobilized combat readiness in his New Year messages from 1974 
to 1977 and, at the 6th convention of the KWP in 1980, also stated that the DPRK had 
secured sufficient military capability to repel every possible invasion from adversaries 
and protect its social system by pursuing a thoroughly self-reliant military line.45 Above 
this, Pyongyang politically supported its military buildup policies by extending Kim’s 
military influence, reemphasizing the 4 Main Military Line, and strengthening ideological 
education in the military; through it all, the regime forced its troops to strengthen their 
military postures and technologies. 
The ultimate objective of these policies was to build a self-reliant defense 
potential. Accordingly, the DPRK’s detailed goals to achieve this were to secure 
independent armed forces, establish a nationwide defense system, develop its own 
defense industries, and heighten a security posture in the rear area. Indeed, these goals 
were gradually achieved by the Kim regime’s continuing reinforcement of military 
personnel and an increasing defense budget; this trend can be proved by the comparison 
of the military strength of the two Koreas, which is summarized in Table 7. Consequently, 
these aggressively promoted military buildup policies helped the KPA compensate for its 
qualitative inferiority to the ROK-U.S. combined forces, by its quantitative superiority to 
them.46 
  
45 Korean Central News Agency, Chosun Central Yearbook 1981, 75. 
46 Kwang-soo Kim, “The Establishment and Development of the Korean People’s Army,” 152. 
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Classifi- 
Cation 













Troops Defense Budget 
1970 64.5 3.0 46.7 6.8 138 44 
1975 63.0 9.1 56.7 17.1 111 53 
1980 63.0 37.1 70.0 32.5 90 114 
1985 63.0 45.5 78.4 34.3 80 133 
1990 65.5 93.8 99.0 49.6 66 189 
1992 65.5 107.7 101.0 55.4 65 194 
Table 7.   Comparison of Military Strength of the Two Koreas (1970–1992)47 
In terms of managing military power, North Korea tried to construct the military 
structure appropriate for the KPA to conduct combination warfare, in which forces 
carried out both regular and irregular battles at once. For starters, since the 1970s, the 
DPRK hugely expanded irregular warfare units and trained them intensively. As Kim’s 
monolithic ideology was emphasized in the early 1970s, his partisan tactics during the 
anti-Japanese war also came into the spotlight. On the basis of this trend, Chief of the 
General Staff Oh Chin-u developed the KPA’s ability to wage combination warfare by 
giving more weight to guerrilla war. For example, the KPA assigned clearly defined 
missions to each special unit by reorganizing the existing VIII Special Corps; by 1978, 
this unit possessed 15 special brigades including eight light infantry brigades, three sniper 
brigades, three airborne brigades, and one amphibious sniper brigade.48 Furthermore, the 
47 Taik-young Hamm, Political Economy of National Security, 152–153; Taik-young Hamm, “State 
Power and Armament of the Two Koreas,” 135–147. 
48 Joseph S. Bermidez Jr., North Korean Special Forces (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1988), 104–114. 
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DPRK tried to make these troops deployable into the South’s rear area swiftly by secretly 
digging several underground tunnels across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). 
Since the late 1970s, Pyongyang focused on completing its preparations for 
combination warfare by reinforcing regular warfare units. To achieve this, Chief of the 
General Staff Oh Keuk-ryul, who stood high in Kim Jong-il’s favor, carried out the 
Soviet-style reforms of regular warfare forces in 1976; these forces started to increase 
noticeably in number and size, as shown in Table 8. Moreover, they were structured for 
mobile warfare by being equipped with automated and mechanized weapon systems. This 
qualitative and quantitative growth of regular warfare forces could be inferred as the 
outcome of the North’s attempt to actualize the concept of the Blitzkrieg tactics by 
improving their mobility and effectiveness.49 Consequently, North Korea could achieve 
balanced development of regular and irregular warfare units, and this military structure 
assisted the KPA in developing the combination warfare strategy, which was suitable to 
the geography of the Korean Peninsula. 
  
49 Kwang-soo Kim, “The Establishment and Development of the Korean People’s Army,” 151–162. 
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Classification 1976 1978 1980 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1993 
Ground 
Mechanized Corps     3 3 5 4 4 
Armored Corps     1  1 1 1 
Self-Propelled 
Artillery Corps     1 1 2 1 1 
Infantry Division 22 20 35 34 24 25 25 30 26 
Armored 
Division/Brigade 2/· 2/· 2/4 2/5 2/7 15/· 15/· 15/· 14/· 
Motorized Infantry 
Division/Brigade  3/· 5/· 3/· 5/· 5/20 ·/30 ·/20 ·/23 
Field Army 
Artillery        8 8 
Corps Artillery        14 14 
Special 
Corps/Brigade 1/10 1/15 1/22 1/26 1/25 1/22 1/22 1/22 1/22 
Navy 
Submarine 8 15 16 21 20 21 24 22 25 
Landing Ship 65 90 102 92 128 129 126 131 131 
Air 
Force 
Air Transport 100 250 251 272 272 272 280 280 305 
Helicopter 13 60 40 60 170 250 287 327 340 
Table 8.   Changing Trend of North Korean Major Troops (1976–1993)50 
The DPRK’s constant production and introduction of weapons also contributed to 
bolstering military power for combination warfare. Kim Il-sung, who stressed Juche 
ideology and self-rehabilitation, tried to foster the North’s own defense industries by 
acquiring the advanced technologies for developing weapons. Of course, given North 
Korea’s poor technological level of those days, it could not completely give up importing 
50 Kwang-soo Kim, “The Establishment and Development of the Korean People’s Army,” 152. 
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new weapons from its communist neighbors, but it could steadily improve its capacity to 
develop simple conventional weapons such as small arms, machine guns, and light 
artillery. Meanwhile, North Korea introduced the Soviet fighters (MiG-21, MiG-29, and 
SU-7), missiles (SA-2 and FROG), and tanks (T-54) in the 1970s and the 1980s; this 
made the KPA able to increase the effect of combination warfare by maximizing the 
mobility of mechanized and armored corps and securing air superiority.51 
In sum, it can be concluded that North Korea maintained military superiority over 
the South during this period by continuing military buildup policies and developing 
suitable military forces for combination warfare. The KPA, despite its worsening 
qualitative inferiority to the ROK-U.S. combined forces, could continue its dominance 
over them through the military buildup policies that guaranteed its quantitative expansion 
and massive defense spending. Furthermore, it could build both irregular warfare units 
for deep operations and regular warfare units for rapid mobile war, as the means to 
pursue a combination warfare strategy. For all these reasons, North Korea, even though it 
was suffering from severe economic difficulties and international isolation, could have a 
slightly higher likelihood of winning a potential war with South Korea. 
B. RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
From the 1970s through the mid-1990s, North Korea’s diplomatic relations were 
greatly affected by the changes in the Cold War system. First, as the new Cold War 
system was created in the 1970s, Pyongyang could maintain solid relations with the 
communist camp while the military pressure from the liberalist camp led by the United 
States increased. Of course, the tensions between the two camps were somewhat eased by 
several cooperative actions such as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) in 
1972, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1973, and the 
Helsinki Accords of 1975. In the late 1970s, however, the international situation cooled 
again because of the Soviet arms buildup and invasion of Afghanistan, which were 
followed by the U.S. response; this new power struggle between them formed the new 
Cold War system. In response to this, Washington postponed a reduction in the number 
51 Taik-young Hamm, Political Economy of National Security, 168. 
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of U.S. forces in Korea, published its plan for the use of nuclear weapons, and initiated 
the large-scale ROK-U.S. combined exercise: Team Spirit.52 
After that, as the bipolar system began to collapse, the DPRK’s diplomatic 
situation also deteriorated gradually in the 1980s. During this period, the Sino-Soviet 
conflict expanded, and Beijing adopted an open-door policy by recovering relations with 
Washington and Tokyo. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, after Mikhail Gorbachev was 
installed as the general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, tried to thaw the Cold 
War relations with America and revitalize its ailing economy by promoting exchanges 
with capitalist countries. In addition, South Korea, which successfully hosted the 1986 
Busan Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, secured a more improved 
international position and expanded diplomatic relations with China, the Soviet Union, 
and the Third World countries. Plus, as the Gulf War, triggered by Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1991, ended with an overwhelming U.S. victory, the unipolar moment of 
American supremacy emerged. 53  All of these changes reduced the North’s foreign 
relations, and made it a more isolated and closed country. 
Despite these disadvantageous international situations, the DPRK’s traditional 
friendly relations with China and the Soviet Union continued, shakily, without being 
severed completely. First, Beijing and Pyongyang kept up the relationship by exchanging 
reciprocal visits by top leaders and giving political support to each other. For example, 
Kim Il-sung officially visited China in 1975, 1982, and 1987 and, especially in his 
informal visit in 1984, discussed the joint struggle against imperialism and asked for 
Chinese support for the North’s unification policy. In response, Hua Guofeng, the 
president of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), visited Pyongyang in 1978, and Deng 
Xiaoping, the vice-president, attended the 35th anniversary of North Korea’s founding in 
the same year.54 Moreover, in the Rodong Sinmun editorial in 1989, the DPRK expressed 
strong support for the CCP’s actions in the Tiananmen Square massacre. For its part, 
52 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 149–150. 
53 Kyu-sup Jeong, North Korea’s Foreign Policy, 129–130. 
54 Dong-gi Shin, “Chinese People Moving Forward the Socialist Way under the CCP’s Control,” 
Global Life, no. 512 (1990): 30–31. 
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China did not want to lose its ally that could act as a buffer against capitalist threats.55 
Therefore, even after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South 
Korea in 1992, the Sino-North Korean alliance continued. 
In a similar way, Soviet-North Korean relations encountered several obstacles but 
were never destroyed. For example, the Soviet open-door policy shaped by Gorbachev, 
and its establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990, inflicted huge 
political and diplomatic losses on North Korea. The Kim regime regarded these 
diplomatic ties as a Soviet betrayal, one which ultimately intended to accept two Koreas, 
bring about the DPRK’s isolation, and subvert the socialist system. 56  These events, 
however, did not mean the collapse of the Soviet-North Korean relations. Pyongyang 
tacitly supported the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. In addition, it established 
separate diplomatic relations with Russia and the other separate states that formed the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).57 Hence, though the extensive political and 
economic exchanges no longer existed, the old allies could maintain basic diplomatic 
activities and friendly attitudes toward each other. 
North Korea barely escaped the danger of being entirely isolated during this 
period, but its overall diplomatic situation was jeopardized by the adverse global 
circumstances and the South’s active international activities. Of course, it is true that 
Pyongyang could continue its official relations with Beijing and Moscow by using some 
formal and informal political means. Nevertheless, the South’s improved global status 
and its northward policy, called Nordpolitik, to repair relations with the North’s 
traditional allies undermined the Kim regime’s diplomacy. This situation worsened due to 
the collapse of the communist camp and the formation of the U.S. unipolar system. 
Finally, after the late 1980s, North Korea became unable to shed its image of a closed 
socialist country having only a few limited foreign relations, the situation it finds itself in 
today. 
55 Rodong Sinmun, “Editorial,” Rodong Sinmun, July 1, 1989. 
56 Rodong Sinmun, “Editorial,” Rodong Sinmun, October 5, 1990. 
57 Korea Institute for National Unification, “Recent Trends of North Korea and the Communist Bloc,” 
Unification, no. 117 (1991): 33. 
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C. REGIME STABILITY 
In the 1970s, to ensure regime stability, North Korea tried to solidify Kim Il-
sung’s monolithic system and organize its society and people’s lives. In the process of 
amending the constitution in 1972, Pyongyang politically supported Kim’s absolute 
power and position by declaring the State President System, and it adopted not only 
Marxism-Leninism but also Juche ideology as its official philosophies.58 Furthermore, all 
activities and life of the people were thoroughly organized and controlled by strict 
regulations and discipline, so the whole society in the late 1970s took the form of the 
almost perfect organization.59 These changes in the political systems could be inferred as 
the intended preparations for Kim Jong-il’s succession in the near future. Therefore, the 
North Korean regime in the 1970s could sustain its stability by legally justifying its 
totalitarian rule and keeping the entire society completely organized. 
In the 1980s, the Kim regime turned its attention to the establishment of the 
succession system in the party and the military. Kim Jong-il was named a member of the 
Central Committee (CC), the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the Political 
Bureau of the ruling Workers’ Party at its 6th convention in 1980, and emerged as the 
undisputed No. 2 man in the country. After that, by directly overseeing most internal and 
external policies except some major international issues, he could expand his political 
influence inside the party. In terms of ideology, he had an exclusive right to interpret 
Juche, so he could build his image as Kim Il-sung’s designated ideological successor. 
Moreover, by taking full control over the Organization and Guidance Department and the 
Propaganda and Agitation Department of the party’s Secretary Bureau, he strengthened 
the people’s ideological education and the idolization of his father.60 During this period 
of his succession training, he gradually dominated the party and gained sufficient internal 
supports and the legitimacy for holding power from the people. 
58 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 155. 
59 Tae-sup Lee, North Korea’s Economic Crisis and Regime Shift (Seoul: Sunin, 2009), 286–287. 
60 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 155. 
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In the 1990s, Kim Jong-il completed the preparations for his succession by 
strengthening his authority in the military. He was appointed as the First Vice Chairman 
of the CMC at the first session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly in 1990 and as 
the Supreme Commander of the KPA at the 19th session of the 6th Plenary Meeting of 
the CC in 1991. This meant that he secured his position as the next supreme leader after 
his father, in both the party and the military. After being named as the state leader in 
1992, he was officially given the title of Chairman of the National Defense Commission 
(NDC) in 1993. 61 Taken together, it can be concluded that the establishment of the 
succession system for the younger Kim and his seizure of power proceeded smoothly. 
On the other hand, South Korea was experiencing political instability due to the 
pro-democracy movement against the military dictatorship. President Park, in order to 
justify his long-term assumption of power, declared a state of national emergency in 
December 1971 by stressing the need for national unity to cope with the crisis. In 
addition, after starting the Revitalizing Reform (Yushin) System in October 1972, he 
affirmed the principle that every national resource and function had to be mobilized to 
promote national security and strength.62 This forceful ruling, however, provoked the 
people’s violent protests, a split in domestic politics, and criticism from the U.S. 
administration. Though the South’s outstanding economic growth and elevated 
international position partially contributed to resolving political instability, popular 
complaints about power-concentrated presidentialism, incomplete democracy, and 
bureaucratic corruption did not disappear easily. Consequently, Seoul, even though it 
acquired civil government in 1993, could not fully stabilize its political situation. 
In sum, during this period, Pyongyang successfully maintained the regime’s  
stability by strengthening Kim Il-sung’s dictatorship and arranging for his son’s 
succession. Although there was a general dissatisfaction with the chronic economic 
depression and aggravated international circumstances, the Kim regime minimized the 
threats and challenges to itself by consolidating the monolithic system and organizing 
society systematically. In particular, on the basis of these political and institutional 
61 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 197–198. 
62 Ibid., 163–164. 
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supports, the DPRK reinforced the younger Kim’s authority in the party and the military 
and laid the foundations for his smooth succession. Compared to the South’s precarious 
political situation, the Kim regime’s stability was the more noticeable phenomenon in the 
aspect of inter-Korean relations. 
D. ECONOMIC POWER 
In the 1970s, the DPRK continually tried to promote economic growth through 
the sequential economic development plans, but the results were insignificant. After 
barely finishing the first seven-year plan (and taking ten years to do it), Pyongyang 
announced the new six-year plan of 1971 to 1976 at the 5th convention of the KWP in 
1970. To achieve the objectives of this plan, North Korea made internal efforts to develop 
high-skilled manpower and external efforts to introduce foreign facilities, technologies, 
and loans. Yet, these sub-objectives encountered several obstacles, such as the North’s 
serious debt problems and international oil price rises in the mid-1970s. Eventually, the 
Kim regime had to terminate the plan one year early in 1975, and weather insufficient 
outcomes for two years.63 
After that, North Korea carried out the second seven-year plan focusing on 
subjectivation, modernization, and scientification of the economy from 1978. 64 Since 
Pyongyang was experiencing difficulties in foreign trade due to the heavy burden of debt, 
it tried to minimize its economic reliance on the giant neighbors by realizing this plan. 
However, as the North’s settlement delay and default persisted, it promulgated the Joint 
Venture Law in 1984 in order to attract direct foreign investments.65 It meant that the 
DPRK accepted the limitations of pursuing economic independence and recognized the 
importance of expanding trade, bringing technologies, and securing external resources. 
Nevertheless, it was too much for North Korea to expect actual investments from the 
Western developed countries, because this law only covered basic matters without any 
detailed guidelines. Consequently, North Korea announced that it had fulfilled this seven-
63 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 157–158. 
64 The Board of National Unification, Current Trend of North Korea (Seoul: The Board of National 
Unification, 1988), 209. 
65 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 158–159. 
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year plan in 1985, but it could not wipe out any practical problems such as deepening 
economic dependency and dire shortages of foods and basic goods. 
In the third seven-year plan, started from 1987, Pyongyang emphasized that its 
first task was to continue enforcing subjectivation, modernization, and scientification of 
the economy to prepare material and technological foundations for an outright victory of 
socialism.66 The Kim regime knew that it had to introduce advanced technologies and 
expand economic exchanges to achieve this goal. Especially, Kim Il-sung noticed the 
importance of foreign trade to escape from severe economic isolation and elevate the 
people’s standard of living. Therefore, at the 40th anniversary of the DPRK’s founding in 
1988, he pointed out that the improvement of external economic relations was necessary 
to enhance the potential of a self-supporting economy and raise North Korean technology 
to the level of advanced countries.67 This suggested that the North Korean leadership 
admitted, to itself, that the traditional socialist economy did not guarantee the survival of 
the regime as well as its economic rehabilitation did. 
Despite this strong willingness of North Korea to further open itself to the outside 
world, its stagnant economic situation showed no sign of improving. Rather, its trade 
volume in the 1980s gradually decreased (as summarized in Table 9), and also its total 
debts mounted up to $5.2 billion in 1988.68 What was worse, the DPRK became the first 
state to be officially branded as a defaulting country by 140 Western creditor banks in 
1987.69 Furthermore, since the 1990s, its economic conditions started to plummet more 
than ever before. For example, its economic growth rate, which had gone down to 
negative levels from 1990, recorded negative 7.6 percent in 1992, and the total debts 
reached $9.28 billion due to its decreasing trade volume and chronic trade deficit.70 
Consequently, since Pyongyang could not import sufficient raw materials and energy, the 
66 The Board of National Unification, Current Trend of North Korea, 291. 
67 Korean Central News Agency, Chosun Central Yearbook 1989, 12. 
68 Mi-jung Park, “Four Suggestions for North Korean Economy,” Dongailbo, September 9, 1989. 
69 B. C. Koh, “North Korea in 1987: Launching a New Seven-Year Plan,” Asian Survey 28, no. 1 
(1988): 64. 
70 Kyong-hwan Lee, “Way for Economic Recovery,” Naeoetongshin, December 3, 1992. 
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operation rate of its industrial facilities remained about 30 to 45 percent, and its food 
situation grew extremely worse during the 1990s. 
 
Classification 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Export 
(USD millions) 1,134.0 681.0 736.7 654.4 693.1 643.3 684.3 
Import 
(USD millions) 1,292.9 1,026.3 1,019.4 980.9 812.6 832.1 819.9 
Table 9.   Changing Trend of North Korea’s Trade Volume (1980–1986)71 
Taken together, it seemed that North Korea’s economy experienced a long-term 
depression in this period, owing to its unrealistic development plans and dwindling 
economic exchanges. Of course, the DPRK’s excessive defense spending, outdated 
industrial facilities, and less-advanced technologies also contributed to its economic 
catastrophe. Yet, while these difficulties could be dealt with by the Kim regime’s efforts, 
the failures of planned economy and external economic relations caused uncontrollable 
foreign debt and negative growth rate. Though Pyongyang tried to increase its trade 
volume and introduce foreign capital and technologies by revising the economic plans 
and enacting the Joint Venture Law, it could not achieve tangible results due to 
disadvantageous international circumstances (such as the oil crisis and the collapse of the 
socialist countries). Finally, North Korea faced a vicious cycle of increasing economic 
dependency and decreasing domestic productivity. 
  
71 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 161. 
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E. CORRELATION WITH THE TYPE OF PROVOCATION 
From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, North Korea usually attempted to overcome its 
unfavorable domestic and foreign conditions and hinder the South’s growth and security 
through terrorist attacks. They might be roughly divided into two categories: early attacks 
within South Korea by overt agents, and later ones abroad, by covert agents. Thus, it can 
be inferred that Pyongyang was gradually trying to preclude Seoul from grasping the 
situation immediately and responding aggressively. In other words, it seemed that North 
Korea intended to escape responsibility for provocations and deter a possible massive 
retaliation by the ROK-U.S. combined forces. The North’s policy making that determined 
this provocation type could be explained by the following decisive factors. 
First, the KPA maintained its superiority over the ROK forces by continuing 
military buildup policies and developing its combination warfare capabilities. In 
particular, due to the leadership’s strong will to secure self-reliant defense capabilities, 
the Kim regime could keep on increasing the investment to expand its military strength, 
despite its severe economic difficulties. Furthermore, by establishing the combination 
warfare strategy that sought synchronized operations in the front and rear areas, the KPA 
strove to strengthen both regular and irregular warfare forces. Therefore, all of these 
efforts helped set a solid foundation to keep its dominant position on the peninsula. 
Second, North Korea experienced the crisis of overall diplomatic relations 
because of the changing international system and the weakened relations with the Soviet 
Union and China. For instance, the formation of the U.S.-led unipolar system and the 
remarkable elevation of the South’s international status did great damage to the North’s 
foreign relations. Although it could keep friendly relations with the two communist 
neighbors, their reform and opening up, especially their establishment of diplomatic ties 
with Seoul, made it hard for Pyongyang to expect vigorous exchanges with them as 
before. Thus, it could be concluded that the North’s diplomatic relations in this period 
were becoming more tenuous and facing more challenges than before. 
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Third, the DPRK regime could secure its stability and form a foundation for the 
power succession by solidifying Kim Il-sung’s monolithic system and organizing the 
society thoroughly. In the 1970s, Pyongyang strengthened the State President System 
through constitutional amendment and formulated rigid rules to tighten its control over 
the people’s lives. In the 1980s, on the basis of this coercive political system, Kim Jong-il 
occupied key positions and reinforced his authority in the party and the military. Hence, 
North Korea, despite the series of collapses in the socialist world, could maintain the 
regime’s stability by protecting its system and ideology. 
Fourth, North Korea’s economy was gravely affected by the continuing failure of 
economic development plans and moribund economic exchange with the outside world. 
The North’s three plans during this period were revised and delayed repeatedly without 
substantial outcomes, and its efforts to promote broader trade and introduce foreign 
resources were blocked by several internal and external obstacles derived from its closed, 
inflexible economy and adverse global issues. For these reasons, there existed an 
unbridgeable economic gap, with Pyongyang suffering from huge debts and Seoul 
experiencing extraordinary economic growth. 
Taken together, the DPRK, despite its military superiority and relatively stable 
regime, faced difficulties in promoting diplomatic relations and economic growth. It 
consistently strengthened the KPA by preparing for combination warfare and firmed up 
the dictatorship to smooth the future hereditary succession. Nevertheless, the changes in 
the Soviet and Chinese foreign policies worsened their relations with Pyongyang, and the 
North’s efforts to boost its struggling economy finally came to naught. Thus, it could be 
inferred that these diplomatic and economic hardships were perceived as serious crises by 
North Korea, so they strongly affected the North’s policy making to overcome those 
crises. 
Given the four decisive factors analyzed above, it seems that the North’s 
provocation type was determined by the attrition strategy during this period. According to 
George, the state having insufficient capacity to adopt the fait accompli strategy seeks a 
guerrilla or terrorist form of attrition strategy to change the status quo by wearing out a 
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relatively strong adversary.72 Similarly, since North Korea, in terms of overall national 
strength and international recognition, was far behind the South, it tried to pass through 
this crisis by choosing terrorist attack as the main provocation type. This is because 
terrorism was the most effective military method for the DPRK to do damage to the 
South’s growth engines and global image, while minimizing the likelihood of massive 
retaliation or all-out war. Therefore, it suggests that North Korea’s policy making in this 
period accorded with the attrition strategy. The major provocations that represented this 
strategic decision were the assassination attempt on President Park in 1974, the Rangoon 
bomb blast in 1983, and the bombing of KAL 858 in 1987. The correlation between the 
decisive factors and the provocation type is summarized in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Correlation between Decisive Factors and Provocation Type (1970s to Mid-
1990s) 
72 George, Avoiding War, 382–383. 
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V. PERIOD OF PROVOKING MARITIME CONFLICT: MID-
1990S TO PRESENT 
Since the mid-1990s, the two Koreas have experienced a hugely widening 
disparity in their military, diplomatic, political, and economic capabilities. For example, 
the tight insularity of the DPRK regime and the collapse of the East-European bloc 
deepened the North’s isolation in the international community, and its economic crisis 
known as the Arduous March showed no signs of recovery. Furthermore, its attempts to 
suppress people’s complaints about these hardships did not meet with expected results 
but, rather, produced severe instability in the regime. Thus, Pyongyang, which was 
absolutely inferior to Seoul in overall national power, tried to overcome these internal 
and external challenges by building up its military strength. Therefore, North Korea, on 
the basis of its Military-First policy, spurred the development of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and long-range ballistic missiles, but it was virtually impossible for 
the KPA to achieve military superiority over the highly advanced and heavily armed 
ROK-U.S. combined forces. 
These changing situations made Pyongyang mainly focus on committing local 
maritime provocations whose impacts were completely controlled. Since the Kim regime 
recognized that its domestic and foreign conditions were markedly unfavorable to itself, 
it tried to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the South. Therefore, the KPA provoked 
elaborately planned local conflicts that the ROK forces could not aggressively respond to, 
and most of them occurred near the maritime border in the West Sea. Accordingly, this 
chapter analyzes the correlations between this provocation type since the mid-1990s and 
the changing decisive factors that affected the North’s policy making. 
A. MILITARY STRENGTH 
In this period, North Korea’s primary military objective was to eliminate possible 
enemy threats and secure a means of diplomatic pressure by building up its self-defense 
capabilities. Hence, the KPA developed its abilities to wield asymmetric power and 
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continued modernizing its conventional forces.73 First, North Korea strove to strengthen 
its asymmetric warfare capabilities, such as WMDs and long-range missiles, to 
strategically threaten Seoul and gain an advantage in negotiations. It was assumed that 
the DPRK began to extract plutonium between 1986 and 1994, and acquired 39 to 49 kg 
of weapons grade plutonium by May 2009. Thus, supposing that North Korea succeeded 
in developing nuclear weapons after its second nuclear test, it can be estimated that the 
KPA currently possesses six to eight 20-kiloton nuclear warheads.74 Moreover, it has 16 
types of chemical agents (with a total stockpile of 2,500 to 5,000 tons), and its capacity to 
produce chemical weapons is ranked third behind America and Russia.75 Plus, there are 
13 types of biological agents in North Korea, and five agents among them (such as 
anthrax, smallpox, plague, cholera, and botulinum) have already been weaponized.76 
The DPRK also continued its ballistic missile program to acquire long-range 
strike capability. After starting to do its own missile research and development from the 
mid-1980s, Pyongyang extended its striking distance to 1,300 km by operationally 
deploying Rodong missiles in 1998. After that, though it failed in its test launches of 
Daepodong-1 in 1998 and Daepodong-2 in 2006 and 2009, the potential of its advanced 
missile technology to threaten the U.S. mainland could be demonstrated. Additionally, as 
North Korea launched a long-range rocket, which it reported as a satellite, in April 2012, 
it became known that the North’s strong ambitions for a vigorous missile program had 
not subsided yet.77 Its missile development process and stockpiles are summarized in 
Tables 10 and 11. 
  
73 Dea-kwang Park and Jin-moo Kim, The Assessment of Surviving Strategy of the Kim Jong Il 
Regime and Future Prospect (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 2011), 111–112. 
74 Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 2009 Northeast Asia’s Military Power and Strategy (Seoul: 
Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, 2010), 53–55. 
75 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2012 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of 
National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2013), 35–36. 
76 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense Policies of the Roh Administration 
(Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2003), 23. 
77 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2012 Defense White Paper, 34–35. 
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Classification Description 
Early 1970s 
North Korea obtains missile technology from 
participation in the People’s Republic of China’s 
missile development program (estimated) 
1976–1981 Introduces USSR-made SCUD-B and launcher from Egypt, initiates reverse engineering and development 
April 1984 First SCUD-B missile test launched 
May 1986 SCUD-C missile test launched 
1988 Operational deployment of SCUD-B/C missiles 
May 1990 First Rodong missiles test launched 
June 1991 SCUD-C missiles launched 
May 1993 Rodong missiles test launched 
1998 Operational deployment of Rodong missiles 
August 1998 Daepodong-1 missile test launched (North insists it to be a satellite) 
July 2006 Daepodong-2, Rodong, and SCUD missiles test launched 
2007 Operational deployment of Musudan missiles 
April 2009 Long-range missile launched (improved version of the Daepodong-2) (North insists it to be a satellite) 
July 2009 Rodong and SCUD missiles launched 
April 2012 Long-range rocket launched (improved version of the Daepodong-2) (North insists it to be a satellite) 
Table 10.   North Korea’s Missile Development Process78 
 
78 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2012 Defense White Paper, 356. 
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Classification Range (km) Warhead (kg) Remarks 
SCUD-B 300 1,000 Operational Deployment 
SCUD-C 500 770 Operational Deployment 
Rodong 1,300 700 Operational Deployment 
Musudan Over 3,000 650 Operational Deployment 
Daepodong-1 2,500 500 Test launch 
Daepodong-2 Over 6,700 650–1,000 (est.) Under development 
New Missile Unidentified Unidentified Under development 
Table 11.   North Korea’s Long-Range Missile Stockpiles79 
Second, in the process of modernizing conventional forces, the KPA focused on 
upgrading existing forces and improving their qualities. Pyongyang, even as it spent more 
resources to strengthen its asymmetric power since the 1990s, did not stop its consistent 
efforts to improve conventional forces in their maneuver, strike, and infiltration 
capabilities to support the combination warfare strategy. As shown in Table 12, the 
North’s conventional power had experienced only a slight quantitative growth during the 
2000s, meaning that the Kim regime focused more on their qualitative improvement than 
quantitative growth. 
  
79 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2012 Defense White Paper, 356. 
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Classification 2000 2010 Variation (%) 








Corps(level) 20 15 -25 
Divisions 67 90 +34.3 
Mobile 
Brigades 69 70 +1.4 
Equipment 
Tanks 3,800 4,100 +7.9 
Armored 
Vehicles 2,300 2,100 -8.7 
Field 
Artillery 12,500 13,700 +9.6 
Navy 
Surface Combatants 430 420 -2.3 
Support Vessels 470 320 -31.9 
Submarines 90 70 -22.2 
Air 
Force 
Fighters 870 820 -5.7 
Support Aircraft 840 530 -36.9 
Helicopters 320 300 +6.3 
Reserve Troops (10,000) 748 770 +2.9 
Table 12.   Quantitative Changes of North Korean Conventional Forces80 
Nevertheless, the DPRK had several fundamental obstacles hindering it from 
using its military power to the full extent. For starters, although Pyongyang officially 
announced its possession of nuclear weapons, it was uncertain whether it had secured 
proper technology to use them in an actual war. Moreover, even if North Korea had 
80 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2000 Defense White Paper, 272; Ministry of 
National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper, 340; Dea-kwang Park and Jin-moo Kim, 
The Assessment of Surviving Strategy, 121. 
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enough capability, no one could be sure that a Northern nuclear attack (which can be 
viewed as a suicidal act) would indeed happen. This was because the ROK-U.S. 
combined forces, which were overwhelming the KPA in both qualitative and quantitative 
aspects, could destroy the Kim regime by launching a large-scale preemptive attack when 
they discovered the North’s movement to use nuclear weapons. This assumption could be 
applied not only to nuclear weapons but also to other WMDs and long-range missiles. 
Another barrier was that the North’s excessively weakened national power could not 
support its conduct of war. It was well known that the KPA was not allocated enough 
resources to train, feed, and manage its troops, owing to the chronic economic depression. 
In addition, North Korean forces were estimated to secure only the minimum amount of 
war reserve stocks (such as two to three month’s ammunition and oil) in peacetime. That 
is to say, the North’s conventional forces were gradually losing their value and 
capabilities as time went on. Consequently, these obstacles devastated North Korea’s 
confidence in its military superiority over the South and its victory in a second Korean 
war. 
B. RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA 
As the international community rated North Korea as one of the rogue states in 
the mid-1990s, its diplomatic relations became further isolated. For instance, it was 
ostracized by the rest of the world due to its coercive political actions such as three-
generation succession, violent dictatorship, and human rights abuses.81 Pyongyang, in 
order to resolve this isolated and pressing situation, and to draw economic assistance 
from other countries, concentrated on developing nuclear weapons and long-range 
missiles. 82  These efforts, however, deepened the concerns of all its neighbors in 
Northeast Asia, and the United States, which was under a conservative government and 
reacting to the September 11 attacks in the early 2000s, roundly denounced the North’s 
81 Kyu-sup Jeong, North Korea’s Foreign Policy, 211. 
82 Deok-min Yoon, “The Assessment of the Current Changes and Trend of North Korean Diplomacy,” 
in Analysis on Major International Issues, ed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea 
(Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea, 2000), 7–8. 
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violation of the Geneva Agreed Framework and designated it as part of an axis of evil.83 
As a result, these miscalculated strategic intentions of North Korea bolstered the U.S. 
leverage on inter-Korean issues, and the North’s diplomatic situation became more 
jeopardized. 
In this context, the traditional friendly relations between North Korea and China 
also went through a crisis. Pyongyang publicly criticized the Sino-South Korean amity in 
1992, and then stopped high-level visits to and from China for a while after the death of 
Kim Il-sung.84 Nevertheless, since both Beijing and Pyongyang agreed on the continued 
need to promote their relations for their common interests and security, they began to 
strengthen their strategic partnership again with Kim Jong-il’s trip to Beijing in 2000.85 
However, the international community, which sought to restrict the North’s nuclear tests, 
weapons exports, and human rights violations, blamed China for its lukewarm attitude 
toward these issues and required it to behave responsibly. Thus, it was not clear whether 
the Sino-North Korean relations essential for the Kim regime’s survival could maintain 
their former friendliness and mutual interdependency. 
Meanwhile, the North’s relations with Russia did not seem to return to the close 
socialist alliance of the past. Even though Pyongyang lost one of its credible ideological 
supporters due the collapse of the Soviet Union, it attempted to establish new cooperative 
relations with Moscow by means of summit meetings and a treaty of friendship in the 
early 2000s. In particular, the two countries confirmed their unified positions on some 
major political and economic issues by signing two joint declarations in Moscow and 
Pyongyang.86 However, since Russia no longer had the same ideological ties with North 
Korea, it could easily decide to take a strong stand against the North’s nuclear tests and 
agreed to the UN sanctions on the DPRK without supporting it unconditionally. To 
83 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 240–241. 
84 Ha-sung Park, “Strained Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang,” Segyeilbo, May 8, 1993. 
85 Joo-ha Kim, “Kim Jong-il’s Trip to Beijing: Profit or Loss?” Dongailbo, August 26, 2010. 
86 Institute for Unification Education, Understanding of North Korea (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 
Republic of Korea, 2008), 76–83. 
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conclude, their relations could not be fully recovered until the Kim regime gave up its 
nuclear program. 
In summary, Pyongyang, in this period, experienced severe diplomatic difficulties 
caused by the broad international pressure on itself and China, and by Russia’s changing 
attitudes toward its issues. Not surprisingly, this diplomatic isolation was the likely 
outcome of the North’s unilateral and threatening policies, and its weakened relations 
with Beijing and Moscow meant that there remained no powerful advocate for the Kim 
regime. Because Pyongyang does not seem inclined to give up its closed dictatorship and 
the WMD that it sees as directly related to its survival, its diplomatic situation will not be 
easily improved in the near future. 
C. REGIME STABILITY 
Kim Jong-il, who had become the supreme leader of North Korea after his 
father’s death in July 1994, tried to ensure regime stability by strengthening the status of 
the military.87 At the Supreme People’s Assembly in September 1998, his speech implied 
the importance of building a so-called garrison state in which the NDC could wield 
powerful influence on every field of government activities for the purpose of securing 
national security.88 Moreover, he reinforced his legal status and rights as the Chairman of 
the NDC by amending the constitution at the Assembly in April 2009, and also began to 
assign key positions of the KWP to high-ranking military personnel beginning in the 
2000s. 89  These changes meant that Pyongyang intended to effectively suppress the 
internal and external threats undermining the regime by establishing the NDC-centered 
unified command system.90 
87 Bong-hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 217–218. 
88 Rodong Sinmun, “Editorial,” Rodong Sinmun, January 1, 1999; Jin-wook Choi, “Changes in North 
Korean Ruling Style and Foreign Policy Following Kim Jong-il’s Health Problem,” Review of the North 
Korean Economy (July 2009): 28. 
89 Seong-il Hyun, North Korean National Strategy and Power Elites: Focusing on Leadership Policy 
(Seoul: Seonin, 2008), 275. 
90 Joon-rae Jo, “North Korea’s Military-First Policy and the Influence of Military Leadership,” The 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Summer 2003): 90. 
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This strong Military-First policy, however, was not enough to dispel the North’s 
mounting social unrest. The people’s complaints about oppressive dictatorship and long-
lasting economic depression had reached an extreme, and this public discontent led to the 
people’s actual defiant behaviors running against the regime’s rule. Some young North 
Koreans, after experiencing capitalist culture, began to cast doubts on socialism, and 
intellectuals directly criticized the contradictions in the party’s system and policies. Plus, 
the number of people who fled North Korea in the face of death increased (as shown in 
Table 13). Despite this, high-ranking party officials, by maintaining an irresponsible 
attitude toward these issues, amplified people’s antipathy to the regime.91 
 
Classification 1988 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
Defectors 947 1,044 1,282 1,382 2,548 2,929 2,706 
Table 13.   North Korean Defectors (1998–2011)92 
South Korea’s consistent hard-line policy against the North made it more difficult 
to maintain the stability of its regime. Even though the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun 
administrations pursued, from 1998 to 2008, the peaceful engagement policies of 
promoting political reconciliation and economic cooperation with North Korea, the 
South’s influential conservative parties criticized the North’s constant provocations, 
human rights issues, and nuclear tests; they were decisive obstacles to offering extensive 
help to Pyongyang. Later, the administration of Lee Myung-bak made a determined effort 
in 2008 to redefine the Kim regime as a serious menace to peace on the Korean Peninsula, 
and attempted to put pressure on the North by solidifying the ROK-U.S. alliance and 
urging the international community to support the UN sanctions. To achieve this, South 
Korea expanded its role in maintaining global peace by actively participating in the UN 
91 Jin-hwan Kim, North Korean Crisis Theory (Seoul: Seonin, 2010), 312–313. 
92  Ministry of Unification, “The Status of North Korean Defectors,” Ministry of Unification, 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/viewPage.req?idx=PG0000000365. 
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Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) and holding the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. All 
of these efforts contributed to destabilizing the North Korean regime. 
Taken together, Pyongyang seemed to be facing grave domestic and foreign 
threats that impacted its stability after the mid-1990s. The people’s increasing dissident 
activities had the possibility to lead to the collapse of the regime, and the South’s 
diplomatic efforts to promote international action against North Korea forced Pyongyang 
to lose its global status. Besides, the North’s attempt to settle these issues by repressive 
measures met with little success, and also Kim Jong-il’s death in 2011 pushed it closer to 
the brink of collapse. Hence, the DPRK regime, even though it managed to accomplish 
Kim Jung-un’s succession, still has a long way to go before it can completely secure its 
stability. 
D. ECONOMIC POWER 
During this period, the state of the DPRK’s economy was catastrophic, which was 
clearly demonstrated by some key economic indicators. For starters, its gross national 
income (GNI) remained stationary, and reached only 2.56 percent of the South’s GNI in 
2010 (as shown in Table 14). Plus, Table 15 suggests that Pyongyang did not fully escape 
from its chronic depression, even though it experienced temporary economic growth. In 
particular, it has been suffering a food shortage of 200 million tons, every year since the 
1990s, which led to the starvation of millions of people and seriously weakened the food 
rationing system.93 Finally, these extended economic difficulties made the Kim regime 
lose its control over the society by prompting illegal private economic activities and 
undermining the concept of collective labor. 
  
93 Statistics Korea, 2011 Major Statistics of North Korea (Daejeon: Statistics Korea, 2011), 59; Bong-
hwa Jeong, North Korean Policy toward South Korea, 249. 
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Classification 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
South Korea (A) 
(USD millions) 569.9 352.1 530.8 576.2 724.5 952.5 937.9 1,014.6 
North Korea (B) 
(USD millions) 21.4 12.6 16.8 17.0 20.8 25.6 24.8 26.0 
A/B Ratio (%) 3.75 3.58 3.17 2.95 2.87 2.69 2.64 2.56 
Table 14.   Comparison of GNI of the Two Koreas (1996–2010)94 
Classification 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Rate (%) -3.6 -1.1 0.4 1.2 0.9 -1.0 3.1 -0.5 
Table 15.   North Korea’s Economic Growth Rate (1996–2010)95 
The reasons for this economic crisis could be largely separated into two categories: 
the imbalanced resource allocation focusing on military buildup and the absence of 
fundamental economic reform. First, since Pyongyang injected an unreasonably large 
portion of the budget into national defense on the basis of its Military-First policy, it 
could not mobilize enough resources for its economic recovery. The Kim regime believed 
that its massive military power was an effective means of protecting national sovereignty 
and promoting internal unity, so it did not give up its military buildup policies despite the 
poor economic situation. Of course, North Korea’s arms exports to several authoritarian 
states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (such as Yemen, Pakistan, Iran, and Syria) 
94 Statistics Korea, 2011 Major Statistics of North Korea, 78. 
95Ibid. 
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contributed significantly to acquiring foreign currency, but these export earnings were not 
sufficient to put an end to the North’s sharp economic downturn.96 
Second, North Korea’s attempts to reform the economy did not bring on 
revolutionary changes in its socialist economic structure. For instance, the Economic 
Management Improvement Measures in 2002 aimed to revive the domestic economy by 
inducing foreign investments in special economic zones, but it could not achieve tangible 
results as the U.S.-North Korean relations became restrained due to the North’s nuclear 
issue. Furthermore, the currency reform in 2009, even though it was carried out to end the 
illegal circulation of money and reaffirm the initial purpose of the planned economy, 
generated sudden inflation, an unstable exchange rate, and an active black market in 
North Korea.97 In other words, these political attempts seemed not to be able to solve the 
North’s structural economic problems such as its economic isolation, poor technology, 
and resource scarcity. 
It was obvious that North Korea realized the seriousness of the economic crisis 
threatening the regime’s survival and adopted various measures to overcome this 
situation. However, despite these efforts, the North’s determined will to beef up military 
strength and blind faith in its socialist economic system were never changed. Therefore, it 
can be expected that Pyongyang will not renounce these values for its economic recovery 
even if it faces a further economic crisis. 
E. CORRELATION WITH THE TYPE OF PROVOCATION 
Given the North’s major provocations during this period, the Kim regime seemed 
to try to provoke controlled maritime conflicts with the South after achieving local 
superiority through elaborate preparations. Since Pyongyang hoped to avert an all-out 
war due to its inferiority in national strength, it planned provocations at the times and 
places favorable to itself and proceeded with its nuclear program to prevent an 
96 Man-kwon Nam, North Korean Military System: Evaluation and Prospect (Seoul: Korea Institute 
for Defense Analysis, 2006) 142.  
97 Yong-soo Park, “The Economic Reform in North Korea and its Barrier,” Journal of International 
Area Studies 13, no. 1 (2009): 52–55. 
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unexpected escalation. Thus, the above-analyzed four decisive factors formed the 
background that made North Korea choose this type of provocation. 
First, the KPA could not maintain its military superiority over the ROK-U.S. 
combined forces, despite its continuous efforts to reinforce asymmetric power and 
upgrade existing conventional forces. For example, North Korea’s technological ability to 
actually launch nuclear weapons was not completely demonstrated yet, and the possibility 
of its nuclear attack was pretty slim because of the expected devastating attack from the 
ROK-U.S. combined forces. Furthermore, the North’s national strength had so declined 
that it could not maintain the performance of its conventional forces and effectively 
prepare for possible war. 
Second, as the international concerns about North Korea mounted and Beijing and 
Moscow’s foreign policies toward the peninsula underwent profound changes, the 
North’s overall diplomatic relations became seriously aggravated. Not surprisingly, the 
international criticism and pressure on the DPRK were inevitable consequences of its 
vicious dictatorship and illegal weapons tests. What was worse was that its former 
ideological allies, China and Russia, also withdrew their unconditional support for the 
North Korean regime, bowing to the diplomatic benefits of siding with world public 
opinion. As a result, Pyongyang came to find itself in the position of having to conceive 
its own survival strategy under the international isolation. 
Third, North Korea’s regime stability was hard to maintain due to its people’s 
increasing dissatisfaction with the social system and the South’s hard-line policy against 
the North. Indeed, quite a few North Koreans, who had gotten tired of failed economic 
policies and restricted lives, were gradually trying to escape from the socialist system, 
and these defiant behaviors jeopardized the institutional base of the Kim regime. 
Moreover, Seoul, by criticizing this tragic situation, discontinued its Sunshine Policy and 
instead induced global cooperation to restrain Pyongyang. Thus, the North’s strategy to 
ensure regime stability by solidifying the monolithic system and organizing the society 
was no longer effective. 
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Fourth, North Korea could not emerge from the prolonged economic slump 
because of its inefficient distribution of resources and unsuccessful economic reforms. 
The North’s economy ebbed and flowed slightly, without completely getting out of the 
depression, and its chronic shortages of food, energy, and basic commodities were 
threatening most people’s lives. In addition, Pyongyang, even though it recognized the 
need to defuse this economic crisis, could not neglect the importance of its military 
buildup and socialist economy. Hence, by sacrificing its economy in this dilemma, North 
Korea brought itself to the brink of economic disaster. 
Taken together, during this period, the DPRK was under unfavorable conditions 
in every decisive factor. This was the result of its unilateral activities that disregarded 
global norms and ethics and only focused on its distorted socialism. Pyongyang tried to 
settle these difficulties by strengthening military capabilities, but its international 
isolation, social instability, and economic crisis only became exacerbated instead of 
getting better. Furthermore, because of these national disadvantages, it decided to spend 
its limited budget mainly in reinforcing its military power, but this did not guarantee its 
military superiority over the South. Finally, North Korea’s new awareness of these 
changing situations made it revise its way of policy making. 
As a result, it could be inferred that Pyongyang, whose policy making was deeply 
affected by the above-mentioned four decisive factors, determined its provocation type by 
applying the strategy of controlled pressure. George insists that a state that fears an 
uncontrollable escalation chooses this strategy to get the enemy into trouble by 
committing a meticulously planned provocation against it. 98 In the same vein, since 
North Korea hoped to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the ROK forces due to its 
inferior national power, it decided to carry out maritime local provocations consistent 
with the strategy of controlled pressure. Indeed, the major provocations of this period 
such as the Yeonpyeong Naval Campaigns in 1992 and 2002, sinking of Cheonan in 
2010, and shelling of Yeonpyeong in 2010 were all elaborately conducted by the KPA at 
the times and places it intended. Therefore, this policy making of North Korea could be 
98 George, Avoiding War, 381–382. 
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explained by the strategy of controlled pressure. The correlation between the decisive 
factors and the provocation type is summarized in Figure 3. 
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This research starts with the question of how the DPRK selects the types of 
provocation it will take. Given that Pyongyang will continue its provocative actions 
against Seoul unless the two Koreas are unified, the answer to this question can give the 
U.S. and South Korean governments a crucial idea to restore peace on the Korean 
Peninsula. For this reason, this research, on the hypothesis that North Korea has 
perceived its security situation as a continuous crisis, analyzes the patterns of its 
determination of provocation types by applying existing models of crisis policy making. 
First, to form the theoretical frame applicable to this study, it draws independent 
variables from Yong-pil Lee’s theory and dependent variables from George’s. Then, it 
divides the major provocations of North Korea into three periods according to their 
similarities, and examines how the decisive factors of each period affected the North’s 
choice of its provocation types. 
The results of the analysis suggest that there were meaningful connections 
between the four decisive factors the DPRK faced in each period and its provocation 
types. First, in the period of triggering war, Pyongyang was in a more advantageous 
position than Seoul in all aspects of military strength, foreign relations, regime stability, 
and economic power. North Korea possessed superior military and economic power to 
the South right after the war, and this national strength, by mixing with the North’s 
favorable political and diplomatic conditions, led the Kim regime to carry out bold and 
daring provocations that could escalate into a full-scale war. Second, in the period of 
committing terror, Pyongyang started to experience economic and diplomatic difficulties 
due to its weakened relations with China and the Soviet Union and unsuccessful 
economic development plans. Although North Korea still maintained strong military 
capabilities and a stable regime, these hardships made the North commit terrorist forms 
of provocations that could give a terrific shock to the South but minimize its retaliatory 
attacks. Lastly, in the period of provoking maritime conflict, North Korea began to lose 
its dominant position in every decisive factor. The North’s diplomatic isolation, 
economic recession, and internal complaints were getting increasingly serious, and its 
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steady efforts to build up its military capacity did not contribute to solving these 
difficulties. Hence, in order to make its position secure in the North-South relationship, 
North Korea focused on provoking maritime conflicts whose impacts were thoroughly 
controlled. All of these changes in decisive factors and provocation types are summarized 
in Figure 4. 
 
 























































































Figure 4.  Changing Trend of Decisive Factors and Provocation Types 
Taken together, these decisive factors of crisis policy making have gradually 
become more unfavorable to North Korea, and the types of its provocations have 
constantly evolved according to those changes. It means that Pyongyang has lost its 
confidence of winning a direct confrontation with Seoul and begun to seriously worry 
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about the South’s response to its menacing actions. For this reason, the aggressiveness 
and boldness of the North’s provocations have decreased more and more, and the means 
of conducting them have become more limited, indirect, and crafty. Given that the four 
factors applied in this study were not the only, but were the most crucial, ones that 
decisively affected the North’s decision-making, it can be concluded that Pyongyang has 
determined the targets, scale, and methods of provocations on the basis of the analysis of 
its current military, diplomatic, political, and economic conditions. 
Therefore, what type of provocations will be initiated by North Korea in the 
future? Of course, it may be impossible to exactly verify how the North’s decisive factors 
will change with the times or how those changes will affect its determination of the types 
of provocations. This is because the North’s subjective evaluation of its domestic and 
foreign situations can be different from the assessment by surrounding countries, and the 
Kim regime can make an extreme decision when it faces unbearably severe difficulties. 
However, the obvious point is that Pyongyang’s confidence to defeat Seoul will not be 
restored soon, and the unexpected strong response of the United States and South Korea 
will confuse the North’s strategic decision. In conclusion, the most effective way for 
South Korea to deter any possible provocations by the North is to put more pressure on 
the Kim regime by using its overwhelming national power and conveying its strong 
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